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NOTES
Racing Towards Color-blindness:
Stereotype Threat and theMyth ofMeritocracy
JONATHAN FEINGOLD*
INTRODUCTION
Stereotype threat may be a possible source of bias in standardized tests, a bias that
arises not from item content but from group differences in the threat that societal
stereotypes attach to test performance.
—Claude Steele1
Imagine a faulty Scantron machine.2 The defective machine adds four points to
the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores of White students. What if a law
school’s admissions office knowingly used this machine? Such behavior would be
morally and constitutionally suspect. While the school is not intentionally discrimi-
nating on the basis of race, it is relying on a defective tool that precludes a race-
neutral, individualized review of every applicant. Aware that the United States
Supreme Court recently invalidated a similar policy,3 the school decides to fix their
defective admissions process. However, the school is unable to stop the Scantron
from allocating points to White students. Fortunately, it is able to adjust the machine
so that it adds four points to the scores of all non-White students. Now, all White
and non-White students receive a four-point bump.
Could the Constitution forbid this type of race-consciousness? Answering this
question begins by turning to a largely forgotten component of Justice Powell’s
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.4 In Bakke, Justice Powell
provided the decisive vote in the Court’s invalidation of the UC Davis Medical
School’s race-conscious admissions program.5 Beyond his holding, the legal commu-
nity most remembers Bakke for Justice Powell’s articulation of student body diversity
as a compelling state interest.6 However, this emphasis on the diversity rationale has
obscured a companion compelling interest identified by Justice Powell. In addition
* J.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law 2012. I thank Jerry Kang for his guidance and support throughout
the writing of this piece. Devon Carbado, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Rachel Godsil, Cheryl Harris, Luke Harris,
Kimberle Crenshaw, and Karen Lorang provided invaluable comments on earlier drafts. © 2012, Jonathan
Feingold.
1. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, 6 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 622 (1997).
2. A Scantron is the machine that calculates standardized test scores.
3. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
admissions program for awarding twenty points to underrepresented minorities on the basis of race).
4. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. Id. at 314.
6. Id. at 311-15 (holding that student body diversity in higher education is a compelling government
interest).
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to student body diversity, Justice Powell suggested that “[r]acial classifications in
admissions could serve a fifth purpose . . . fair appraisal of each individual’s academic
promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures.”7
This statement reveals Justice Powell’s understanding that measurement biases
have the potential to corrupt the tools, such as admissions tests, that we view as
neutral and meritocratic. Thus, as if imagining the faulty Scantron machine, Justice
Powell concluded that if “race and ethnic background were considered only to the
extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it
might be argued that [race-conscious admissions constitute] no ‘preference’ at all.”8
Justice Powell recognized that when beginning from a baseline of defective measures,
race-conscious interventions that correct the defect actually mitigate preference and
promote merit. This understanding of race-consciousness presents an important
opportunity for self-reflection from color-blind jurisprudence.9 If color-blindness
dictates that public institutions of higher education should never make decisions on
the basis of race, what does color-blindness prescribe if we discover that the current
law school admissions regime relies on a tool as defective as our hypothetical Scan-
tron machine?10
While there may be a debate over the particulars, most agree that the general
concepts of fairness and merit should drive law school admissions. I am not entering
the fairness debate. This Note is focused solely on merit.11 For the purposes of my
argument, I accept the normative claim that the allocation of scarce resources (e.g.
admission to elite law schools) should occur on the basis of merit as measured by
traditional indicia such as the LSAT.12 However, this concession to meritocracy
demands that we rely on “fair measures.”13 At a basic level, “fair measures” exist
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43 (1978). To support my claim that the legal world has “forgotten” about this
component of Justice Powell’s opinion, I point to the dearth of academic scholarship engaging this “test bias”
rationale. A Westlaw search revealed 1,615 articles mentioning the diversity rationale [search terms: diversity
& “compelling interest” & “438 U.S. 265”], yet only ten articles mentioning “test bias” rationale [search
terms: “to the extent that race and ethnic background”].
8. Id.
9. “Color-blindness” rejects governmental recognition of race. Chief Justice Roberts exemplified this
notion in Parents Involved. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (“The way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
For a critique of color-blindness see Laurence Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law be
Color-Blind, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201 (1986).
10. While it is unclear exactly what the LSAT measures, I employ “talent” and “merit” throughout this
Note to refer to the highly valued attributes that the LSAT supposedly measures. Since my fair-measures
argument demands only that the LSAT equally and accurately measure the “talent” of all individuals, it is
unnecessary to define this term with greater precision.
11. A critique of our common conceptions of merit is unnecessary for the purposes of this Note. I thus
avoid that discussion. Still, it is important to recognize that merit is a suspect concept that has acquired the
veneer of neutrality and objectivity through a process of normalization and naturalization. See, e.g., Daria
Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias andMerit, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (1997).
12. I am making an argument-specific concession that LSAT scores are an acceptable proxy for legal talent,
one factor that should be considered when making admissions decisions.
13. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) (“‘Fair’ connotes the moral intuition that being fair involves an absence
of unwarranted discrimination, by which we mean unjustified social category-contingent behavior. The term
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when our tools accurately measure the talent of every student without regard to social
categories such as race.
Recent social-science findings suggest that the LSAT is not meeting this de-
mand.14 This failure of fair measures is due to stereotype threat,15 a psychological
phenomenon that depresses the performance of negatively stereotyped groups when
performing stereotype-relevant tasks.16 When exposed to stereotype threat, vulner-
able Black and Latino/a LSAT-takers suffer from a race-dependent measurement
bias.17 Functionally, this measurement bias is no different than the faulty Scantron
machine discussed above. In the presence of stereotype threat, the LSAT is a defective
tool that prevents otherwise qualified Black and Latino/a students from displaying
their true talent. Understood in this way, reliance on the LSAT contravenes fair
measures and deprives Black and Latino/a applicants of the individualized review our
Constitution demands.18
The harm arising from this “fair measures” defect extends beyond those students
who would have gained admission but for stereotype threat. As a consequence of the
disproportionate exclusion of talented Black and Latino/a students, the few Blacks
and Latinos/as who access elite institutions face unique burdens associated with their
token status.19 A holistic understanding of the harm produced by reliance on a
defective measure of talent requires broadening our view beyond the single moment
of admissions decision-making.
Part I of this Note explores the psychological phenomenon of stereotype threat
and its implications regarding the performance of Black and Latino/a students on the
LSAT and in law school. Taking the science seriously complicates our historical
acceptance of the LSAT as a neutral judge of talent. Recognizing these issues, Part II
presents rescaling, an intervention that cures stereotype threat-induced measurement
biases. Specifically, rescaling offsets the mismeasurement of vulnerable Black and
Latino/a students by correcting scores in accordance with the observed mean effect of
stereotype threat on LSAT-takers. As this measure entails express race-consciousness,
policy and legal objections will inevitably arise. Responding first to policy concerns, I
argue that rescaling is not solely a “fair measures” remedy. Rescaling additionally
enables the attainment of a critical mass of underrepresented students. Critical mass
prevents the manifestation of racially hostile environments in law school classrooms
that carry their own set of race-dependent burdens. Thus, by relying on a more
accurate measure of Black and Latino/a talent at the admissions stage, rescaling also
also connotes accuracy in assessment. ‘Measure’ has the double meaning as well: measurement and an
intervention intentionally taken to solve a problem.”).
14. This claim is not limited to the LSAT. Stereotype threat is likely to affect vulnerable individuals across
all highly time-pressured standardized tests.
15. For an accessible review of stereotype threat see CLAUDE STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER
CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US (2010).
16. See infra Part I.
17. In other words, an LSAT score of 165 for a vulnerable, stereotype-threatened Black student is not the
same as a score of 165 for their White peer. See STEELE, supra note 15.
18. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-37 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-76
(2003); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-16 (1978).
19. In other words, fair measure defects inhibit the attainment of a diverse student body.
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facilitates the attainment of diverse student bodies that foster a more race-neutral and
level playing field within legal institutions.
Having connected the complementary and interdependent goals of fair measures
and critical mass, Part III presents a constitutional defense of rescaling. I argue that
our knowledge about stereotype threat breathes new life into Justice Powell’s forgot-
ten insight from Bakke. Such resuscitation does not require creating a “new” compel-
ling interest. However, the reality of stereotype threat and its relation to
underrepresentation in law school calls for an updated understanding of the well-
established compelling interests of diversity and remedying discrimination. Our new
understanding of stereotype threat contests the notion that critical mass (i.e. the
achievement of meaningful diversity) and fair measures (i.e. the eradication of dis-
crimination) function independently of one another. Rather, since the promotion of
fair measures enables the achievement of a critical mass, I present a fair measures-
critical mass frame that recognizes the interdependence of these intimately connected
goals. Understood through this hybrid diversity-remedying discrimination lens, re-
scaling emerges as a constitutional policy that directly promotes these historically
recognized interests.
I. STEREOTYPE THREAT
Like many standardized tests, the LSAT continues to produce significant racial
disparities.20 In the 2008-2009 school year, White LSAT-takers scored on average
ten points higher than Blacks and six points higher than Latino/as (SD  8.94).21
Various rationales have been offered to explain the racial gap in standardized testing:
genetic inferiority,22 lack of preparation,23 lack of effort, inferior schooling,24 cul-
tural deficiency,25 and family structure and poverty.26 These explanations, whether
implicating nature or nurture, share the common assumption that lower scoring
minorities lack merit, and thus, do not belong in elite institutions.27
20. See LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES, LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/
ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 2003-2004 THROUGH 2009-2010 TESTING YEARS, http://www.lsac.org/Lsac
Resources/Research/TR/TR-10-03.pdf.
21. Id. at 19, tbl. 4A.
22. See, e.g., RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994); ARTHUR JENSEN,
EDUCABILITY AND GROUP DIFFERENCES (1973).
23. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NA-
TION, INDIVISIBLE 402-03 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Ronald G. Fryer Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap in the
First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 447 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Burden of Acting White: Do Black Adolescents Disparage
Academic Achievement? in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 375 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips
eds., 1998); Signthia Fordham & John Ogbu, Black Students’ School Successes: Coping with the Burden of Acting
White, 18 URBAN REV. 176 (1986).
26. See CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, eds., 1997);
SUSAN MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES (1997); Meredith
Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Practices, and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 375 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
27. See STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader,
eds., 2011).
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Even if socioeconomic realities and unequal access to resources produce part of
the achievement gap, these explanations prove incomplete. A gap remains even when
controlling for the above factors.28 Race plays a role. Contrary to biological explana-
tions, however, underperformance is not the result of the inherent inferiority of
Black and Latino/a students.29 Rather, this otherwise unexplained portion of the
racial gap is, in part, a consequence of stereotype threat, a psychological phenom-
enon tied to social stereotypes and the racial identities of Black and Latino/a stu-
dents.30
Stereotype threat is defined as the “social-psychological threat that arises when one
is in a situation or doing something for which a negative stereotype about one’s
group applies.”31 In their book on stereotype threat, Professors Michael Inzlicht and
Toni Schmader explain that years of research has shown that the “fear of stereotype
confirmation can hijack the cognitive systems required for optimal performance,
resulting in low test performance.”32
A. The Studies33
African Americans and Intellectual Ability. In their seminal study, Claude Steele
and Joshua Aronson focused on the interaction between racial identity, stereotype,
and the cognitive performance of highly talented and confident Black students from
Stanford University.34 Steele and Aronson administered thirty-minute tests com-
posed of verbal GRE questions to White and Black participants.35 They varied the
28. See Fryer Jr. & Levitt, supra note 24, at 447 (“Even after controlling for a wide range of covariates
including family structure, socioeconomic status, measures of school quality, and neighborhood characteris-
tics, a substantial racial gap in test scores persists.”); Claude M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black
Americans, 269 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 68 (1992) (arguing that standard explanations are incomplete, as low
SAT scorers are not more likely to flunk out than high SAT scores; achievement gaps exist even when Blacks
do not suffer financial disadvantage; and controlling for any level of previous school preparation, Blacks
achieve less in subsequent schooling than do Whites).
29. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Affirmative Action Laws,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1109-17 (2009) (demonstrating that when socioeconomic factors are taken into
account yet discrepancies remain, minority deficiency-based explanations inherently rely on biological no-
tions of race); Devon M. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 633 (2009) (exposing the fragility of
biological arguments).
30. See Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores Systematically
Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132, 1132 (2009)
(“[A]t least a portion of group differences is illusory . . . this results from pervasive psychological threats in
academic environments, which undermine the performances of ethnic minority students and of women.”).
Walton and Spencer observed an effect size for Blacks and Latino/as on the Math and Reading SAT ranged
between 39 and 41 points, with an overall Black/White and Latino/a/White disparity of 199 and 148 points
respectively. Id. at 1137.
31. Steele, supra note 1, at 614.
32. Inzlicht & Schmader, supra note 27.
33. There are well over one hundred published studies on stereotype threat. I chose to highlight these
particular studies primarily because they successfully illustrate the contextual nature of stereotype threat. They
also show stereotype threat is not limited to racial or historically subordinated groups and that stereotype
threat is most burdensome on the vanguard of a group.
34. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of
African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
35. Id. at 799.
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level of stereotype relevance by presenting the task in multiple ways. Half of the
students were told the activity measured intellectual aptitude. Priming students in
this way increased the relevance of negative stereotypes about Black cognitive ability.
For the other half, Steele and Aronson negated the relevance of societal stereotypes
by presenting the task as a problem-solving experiment unrelated to innate ability.36
The results suggested that this slight environmental change—presenting an activity
as diagnostic or non-diagnostic of a negatively stereotyped trait—was sufficient to
affect performance. Black students in the “intellectual ability” group performed
significantly worse than their White counterparts.37 However, Black students in the
“problem solving” group performed at the level of their White counterparts.38
(Asian) Women and Math. A gender achievement gap persists in the fields of
mathematics and the hard sciences. Traditional explanations invoke notions of inher-
ent gender differences39 and gender-role socialization.40 Similar to the rationales
explaining the racial achievement gap, these explanations fail to tell the entire story.
A pair of 1999 studies began to fill in the gap.41 In the first study, researchers
selected a group of men and women undergraduates highly skilled in math.42 The
participants completed either a very difficult or a relatively easy math test.43 Women
performed significantly worse than men on the difficult test.44 However, the easier
test produced no gender difference.45 Did the results suggest a biological ceiling on
women’s math ability? Or, had something extraneous to innate talent inhibited the
women’s performance on the more difficult exam?
To answer this question, the researchers re-administered the difficult test to all
participants. This time, however, they varied the degree to which gender stereotypes
were relevant to performance.46 For the first group, administrators primed a negative
stereotype about women by informing participants that the test had previously shown
gender differences.47 For the second group, administrators removed any relevance of
math-gender stereotypes by explaining that the test had never shown gender differ-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 801 (controlling for SAT).
38. Id. at 801-02.
39. See, e.g., Lawrence Summers, Sciences Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &
Engineering Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.
harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html.
40. See, e.g., Janet K. Swim, Perceived Versus Meta-Analytic Effect Sizes: An Assessment of the Accuracy of
Gender Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1994); Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Janis E. Jacobs &
Rena D. Harold, Gender Role Stereotypes, Expectancy Effects, and Parents’ Socialization of Gender Differences,
46 J. SOC. ISSUES 183 (1990).
41. See Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. Steele & Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math
Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 7 (1999); Margaret Shih, Todd L. Pittinsky & Nalini
Ambady, Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI.
80 (1999).
42. Spencer, Steele & Quinn, supra note 42, at 8 (selecting students who scored above the 85th percentile
on the SAT Math section and strongly identified with math).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 10-11.
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ences.48 This seemingly minor instruction greatly impacted results. While the “gen-
der difference” group retained a significant disparity,49 women in the “no-difference”
group performed at the same level as men.50 Thus, innate ability was not responsible
for the previously observed gender gap. Underperformance was not the result of
biology or a lack of ability.
If membership in a negatively stereotyped group undermines performance, could
membership in a positively stereotyped group boost performance? To answer this
question, researchers examined the interplay between the conflicting identities of
Asian American women in the domain of math.51
Asian American female undergraduates answered a set of difficult math ques-
tions.52 Prior to each test, the students filled out one of three questionnaires. The
questionnaires were intentionally designed to either: 1) prime gender identity;53
2) prime racial identity;54 or 3) prime neither identity.55 The results confirmed that
the relevant stereotype, as opposed to innate ability, dramatically predicted perfor-
mance. The control group answered an average of 49% of questions correctly, whereas
the race-prime group answered 54% correctly and the gender-prime group answered
only 43% correctly.56 To verify the perceived role of stereotype threat, researchers
recreated the experiment in Vancouver, Canada, a community where the “Asians are
good at math” stereotype does not exist.57 Unlike the American study, the race-
prime group experienced a depression in performance.58 These findings added sup-
port for the theory that the specific societal stereotype, not race itself, was the main
culprit affecting performance.
White Men and Math. The preceding studies illustrate stereotype threat’s ability to
affect the performance of individuals from historically stigmatized groups. But it is
not just minorities and women who are vulnerable to stereotype threat.
A set of studies revealed this equal-opportunity characteristic of stereotype threat
by observing its effect on highly math-proficient White male undergraduates.59 The
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id.
51. See Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, supra note 41, at 80. “Conflicting identities” refers to the positive
stereotype associated with Asians and math and the negative stereotype associated with women and math.
52. Id. at 81 (selecting students with a mean Quantitative SAT score of 750.9).
53. Id. (asking gender-specific questions).
54. Id. (asking questions about language and family genealogy).
55. Id. (asking questions about phone and cable service).
56. Id. All participants demonstrated similar levels of motivation, thus supporting the notion that under-
performance was not caused by a lack of effort.
57. Id. at 82. This stereotype does not exist because Vancouver’s Asian community is composed largely of
recent immigrants. Id.
58. Id. (observing that while the control group answered 59% of the questions accurately, both the
racial-prime and gender-prime groups answered correctly only 44% and 29% respectively).
59. See Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and Sufficient Factors in
Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 33 (1999) (selecting students with an average
Math SAT score of 712 and who strongly identified with the domain of math). See also, Jessi L. Smith &
Paul H. White, An Examination of Implicitly Activated, Explicitly Activated, and Nullified Stereotypes on
Mathematical Performance: It’s Not Just aWoman’s Issue, 47 SEX ROLES 179 (2002).
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participants completed a set of difficult math questions.60 Mirroring earlier studies,
administrators varied the relevance of identity through distinct presentations of the
task. For the first group, administrators characterized the study as an attempt to
understand Asian superiority in math.61 For the second group, administrators did
not mention Asians. They stated solely that the test was a measure of math ability.62
Consistent with previous findings, the mere situational change (addition of Asian-
positive stereotype) was enough to disrupt performance. Participants in the first
group answered an average of 36% questions correctly, while participants in the
second group answered over 53% correctly.63
B. “A Threat in the Air”
The foregoing examples comprise only a small sample of the many studies docu-
menting the adverse effects of stereotype threat.64 This research has documented
stereotype threat across numerous axes of identity: including socioeconomic status,65
age,66 gender,67 and race.68 Each study tells a similar story. When individuals con-
60. Aronson et al., supra note 59, at 34 (coming from the GRE mathematics subject test).
61. Id. at 33 (providing participants with articles from noteworthy sources that emphasized the growing
math achievement gap between Asians and Whites).
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id.
64. For two comprehensive meta-analyses, see Hannah-Hanh D. Nguyen & Ann M. Ryan, Does Stereotype
Threat Affect Test Performance ofMinorities andWomen? AMeta-Analysis of Experimental Evidence, 93 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 1314 (2008) (analyzing 116 studies from 76 published reports); Walton & Spencer, supra note 30
(analyzing thirty-nine studies on stereotype threat). Thirty years before Steele’s seminal work, studies had
uncovered findings that we can now understand as the product of stereotype threat. For instance, Katz,
Roberts, and Robinson found that Black students performed better on an IQ test when presented as diagnos-
tic of hand-eye coordination than when presented as diagnostic of intelligence. See Irwin Katz, S. Oliver
Roberts & James M. Robinson, Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and Instructions on Digit-
Symbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1965).
65. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Croizet & Theresa Claire, Extending the Concept of Stereotype Threat to Social
Class: The Intellectual Underperformance of Students from Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds, 24 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 588 (1998) (observing the effect of stereotype threat in low socio-economic status
French students); Bettina Spencer & Emanuele Castano, Social Class is Dead. Long Live Social Class! Stereotype
Threat Among Low Socioeconomic Status Individuals, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 418 (2007) (observing performance
decrements for low socio-economic status individuals when negative stereotypes are made relevant).
66. See, e.g., Becca Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping, 71 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1092 (1996) (observing that the implicit activation of positive stereotypes concerning
aging improved memory performance in elderly participants, while an implicit activation of negative stereo-
types worsened memory performance); Thomas M. Hess et al., The Impact of Stereotype Threat on Age
Differences inMemory Performance, 57 J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. P3 (2002) (observing that contextual
factors affected memory performance).
67. See, e.g., Linette M. McJunkin, Effects of Stereotype Threat on Undergraduate Women’s Math Perfor-
mance: Participant Pool vs. Classroom Situations, 45 EMPORIA STATE RES. STUD. 27 (2009) (observing that
female students experienced a significant improvement on math tests in classroom and laboratory settings
when the relevance of negative stereotypes were explicitly alleviated); Toni Schmader, Gender Identification
Moderates Stereotype Threat Effects on Women’s Math Performance, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 194
(2001) (observing that domain identification mediated stereotype threat effects on women); Johannes Keller
& Dirk Dauenheimer, Stereotype Threat in the Classroom: Dejection Mediates the Disrupting Threat Effect on
Women’s Math Performance, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 371 (2003) (observing sixth grade girls
underperformed on math tests when “reminded” that girls were bad at math).
68. See, e.g., Joshua Aronson, Carrie B. Fried & Catherine Good, Reducing the Effects of Stereotype Threat
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front tasks capable of confirming a negative group stereotype, performance suffers.
However, when subtle environmental manipulations remove this threat, the perfor-
mance decrement disappears. This situational nature of stereotype threat led Profes-
sor Claude Steele to label the phenomenon a “threat in the air.”69 Identifying the
debilitating effect of situational racial contingencies disrupts traditional explanations
for the achievement gap on standardized tests. Under such conditions, tests like the
LSAT are not neutral evaluators of talent and underperformance is not the result of
inherent minority deficiencies.
The unique burdens encountered by stereotype-threatened individuals produce
measureable physiological responses.70 The particular mechanism that causes stereo-
type threat has been described as a “disruptive mental load”71 that inhibits “working
memory.”72 Working memory refers to the cognitive processes that enable an indi-
vidual to “control the focus of one’s attention and regulate behavior.”73 While almost
all individuals experience anxiety and stress on high stakes tests, this particular disrup-
tion of working memory uniquely burdens stereotype-threatened individuals. Steele
on African American College Students by Shaping Theories of Intelligence, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 113
(2002); Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213 (1999) (“Black participants performed significantly worse than did control partici-
pants when performance on a golf task was framed as diagnostic of ‘sports intelligence.’ In comparison, White
participants performed worse than did control participants when the golf task was framed as diagnostic of
‘natural athletic ability.’”); Jeff Stone, Battling Doubt by Avoiding Practice: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on
Self-Handicapping in White Athletes, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1667 (2002); Patricia M.
Gonzalez, Hart Blanton & Kevin J. Williams, The Effects of Stereotype Threat and Double-Minority Status on
the Test Performance of Latino Women, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 659 (2002) (demonstrating
negative effects of stereotype threat on Latina participants).
69. Steele, supra note 1. See also, STEELE, supra note 15, at 93 (“[W]hatever the skills or vulnerability a
group may have, situational differences in stereotype threat alone—contingencies of social identity—are fully
sufficient to affect intellectual performance substantially.”).
70. See, e.g., STEELE, supra note 15, at 121 (“[P]art of stereotype threat’s effect . . . is caused directly by its
effect of increasing heart rate, blood pressure, and related physiological signs of anxiety to the point that these
reactions interfere with performance.”); Jim Blascovich et al., African Americans and High Blood Pressure: The
Role of Stereotype Threat, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 225 (2001) (observing a correlation between higher blood pressure
of stereotype-threatened Blacks and worse performance on difficult test items as compared to Whites and
non-stereotype-threatened Blacks); Wendy Berry Mendes et al., Challenge and Threat During Social Inter-
actions with White and Black Men, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 939 (2002) (observing that
White students forced to speak with an unfamiliar Black student exhibited a substantial increase in blood
pressure as compared with White students meeting an unfamiliar White student).
71. See Jean-Claude Croizet et al., Stereotype Threat Undermines Intellectual Performance by Triggering a
Disruptive Mental Load, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 721 (2004).
72. See Toni Schmader, Michael Johns & Chad Forbes, An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat
Effects on Performance, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 336 (2008); Toni Schmader & Michael Johns, Converging
Evidence that Stereotype Threat Reduces Working Memory Capacity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440
(2003). Stereotype-threatened women displayed lessened activity in the areas of the brain associated with
mathematical learning, yet increased activity in areas associated with social and emotional processing. See
Anne C. Krendl et al., The Negative Consequences of Threat: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investiga-
tion of the Neural Mechanisms Underlying Women’s Underperformance in Math, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 168 (2008).
Steele comments that this “increase[d] vigilance toward possible threat and bad consequences in the social
environment, [thus] diverts attention and mental capacity away from the task at hand, which worsens
performance and general functioning, all of which further exacerbates anxiety, which further intensifies the
vigilance of threat and the diversion of attention.” STEELE, supra note 15, at 123-26.
73. Schmader, Johns & Forbes, supra note 72, at 340.
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referred to this additional burden, which is limited to individuals facing the threat of
confirming a stereotype, as a “pioneer tax.”74 Working memory is especially relevant
to standardized tests because this particular cognitive process becomes essential on
speeded tasks that push individuals to the limits of their ability.75 Highly speeded
and difficult tests such as the LSAT, law school finals, and the Bar exam are precisely
the types of situations where we would expect stereotype threat to be most dis-
ruptive.76
Two elements of stereotype threat warrant emphasis. First, while we intuitively
believe that better, smarter, and more perseverant students will be better able to
overcome obstacles such as stereotype threat, the opposite is true.77 This is the
underlying irony of stereotype threat. As a result of their high “domain identifica-
tion,”78 the confident and talented students we would expect to overcome psychologi-
cal hurdles are actually the most susceptible.79 For the vanguard, the desire and
commitment to outperform or disprove stereotypes often produces “over-efforting”
that counterproductively distracts attention from the particular task at hand.80 Thus,
while we may be inclined to tell students to try harder, such advice may only exacer-
bate the problem.
74. Claude M. Steele, Expert Report of Claude M. Steele, (Jan. 15, 2011), available at http://www.
vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/steele.html (“[Stereotype-threatened students] pay an extra tax
on their investment there, a ‘pioneer tax,’ if you will, of worry and vigilance that their futures will be
compromised by the ways society perceives and treats their group. And it is paid everyday, in every stereotype-
relevant situation.”).
75. See Schmader, Johns & Forbes, supra note 73, at 340-41. See also Laurie T. O’Brien & Christian S.
Crandall, Stereotype Threat and Arousal: Effects on Women’s Math Performance, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 782 (2003) (observing that stereotype threat adversely affected women’s performance on a
difficult math test, yet women performed better under the same conditions when taking an easy math test);
Talia Ben-Zeev, Steven Fein & Michael Inzlicht, Arousal and Stereotype Threat, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 174 (2005) (extending and confirming the O’Brien & Crandall study).
76. See John L. Horn & Nayena Blankson, Foundations for Better Understandings of Cognitive Abilities, in
CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS AND ISSUES 41 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L.
Harrison, eds., 2d ed. 2005).
77. See Steele, supra note 1, at 617 (“Stereotype threat affects only a subportion of the stereotyped group
and, in the area of schooling, probably affects confident students more than unconfident ones . . . Stereotype
threat should have its greatest effect on the better, more confident students in stereotyped groups, those who
have not internalized the group stereotype to the point of doubting their own ability and have thus remained
identified with the domain—those who are the academic vanguard of their group.”).
78. “Domain identification” refers to individuals who strongly identify with, and care about performing
well in, a particular domain, such as sports or academics. See Nguyen & Ryan, supra note 64, at 1315-16.
79. See STEELE, supra note 15, at 56-59 (discussing a study examining the effect of stereotype threat on
high and low achieving high school students).
80. Steele uses “over-efforting” to describe the desire to disprove the stereotype as an “additional task”
capable of producing a “stressful and distracting” form of multitasking. Id. at 110-11; Steele & Aronson, supra
note 34, at 808 (“Black participants . . . reread the test items more than White participants. Such findings do
not fit the idea that these participants underperformed because they withdrew effort from the experiment.”);
David A. Nussbaum & Claude M. Steele, Situational Disengagement and Persistence in the face of Adversity,
43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 127 (2007) (observing that when under threat, Black participants
burdened themselves by spending more time on difficult problems than their white counterparts). Accord
O’Brien & Crandall, supra note 75 (observing that over-efforting exists whenever a negative stereotype is
made relevant, but only inhibits performance when the activity pushes participants to the limits of their
ability).
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Second, self-awareness of one’s identity and the latent salience of a relevant nega-
tive stereotype in a particular domain are sufficient to trigger stereotype threat.81 As a
result of this “stigma consciousness,”82 the negative stereotype associated with an
individual’s group is readily available and relevant to their performance.83 Within
such environments, explicitly priming a stereotype-relevant identity is not always
necessary to trigger stereotype threat.84 The simple self-awareness that negative stereo-
types attach to an individual and her respective performance in a given domain is
sufficient. Further, stigma consciousness is most likely to materialize in environ-
ments characterized by dramatic underrepresentation. Law school classrooms and
testing environments, in which racial underrepresentation and historical stereotypes
pervade, are thus ripe for stereotype threat.
C. Challenging the Science—Ecological Validity
Although laboratory studies have conclusively produced stereotype threat ef-
fects,85 policy decisions ultimately depend on stereotype threat’s ecological valid-
ity.86 Unfortunately, ethical87 and pragmatic88 obstacles inherent to stereotype threat
81. See infra Part II.D.
82. See Elizabeth C. Pinel, Stigma Consciousness: The Psychological Legacy of Social Stereotypes, 76 J. PERSON-
ALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 114 (1999) (employing “stigma consciousness” to refer to the level at which individuals
are self-conscious of their stigmatized status).
83. In a retrospective piece, then Trinity College senior Ronald Satterthwaite recalled his own self-
awareness: “As I grew older, I became more aware of the negative stereotypes that came with being a black
male as far as intelligence and schooling are concerned. I learned that on standardized tests that I was taking, I
wasn’t supposed to be scoring as high as I did and that, eventually, I had a 20 percent chance of dropping out
of school and ending up in jail.” Ronald Satterthwaite, Rising Above the Stereotype Threat, Race, Ethnicity and
Me, 1 (Trinity University Publication).
84. See Steele & Aronson, supra note 34, at 808 (concluding that the “mere cognitive availability of the
racial stereotype is enough to depress Black participants’ intellectual performance”).
85. Even skeptics of stereotype threat’s ecological validity affirm the existence of stereotype threat within
laboratory settings. See, e.g., Paul R. Sackett et al., On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for African
American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 7 (2004) (“Steele and Aronson clearly
showed that imposing and eliminating stereotype threat can, in laboratory settings, affect the test performance
of both African American and White students.”).
86. Ecological validity refers to the generalizability of a phenomenon beyond the laboratory to real world
settings.
87. See Claude M. Steele, Stephen J. Spencer & Joshua Aronson, Contending with Group Image: The
Psychology of Stereotype and Social Identity Threat, in 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
379 (M. Snyder, ed., 2002) (“Doing something that might affect a person’s performance on a real-life high
stakes test is, in most imaginable situations, unacceptable without informed consent, which may be unreliable
to get in such situations.”).
88. It is nearly impossible to measure the level of ambient threat experienced by vulnerable individuals
prior to external manipulations. Thus, researchers must make assumptions about whether the baseline reflects
the threat or control conditions from laboratory settings. See Lawrence J. Stricker & William C. Ward,
Stereotype Threat, Inquiring About Test Takers’ Ethnicity and Gender, and Standardized Test Performance,
34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 665, 690 (2004) (“A clear limitation of these studies was that data were only
available about test performance and not about its possible causes . . . This limitation is close to inevitable in
field experiments in operational settings that must rely on unobtrusive observations.”); Michael J. Cullen,
Chaitra M. Hardison, & Paul R. Sackett, Using SAT-Grade and Ability-Job Performance Relationships to Test
Predictions Derived from Stereotype Threat Theory, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 220 (2004) (“In the laboratory
setting, it is feasible to present differing cover stories about the purpose of a test . . . In high-stakes testing, the
purpose of the test is clear to the applicants and it is doubtful that it would be believable—or ethical—to
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constrain our ability to directly measure its relevance beyond the laboratory setting.
As a result, few researchers have taken up this task. Among those who have, some
have cautioned against generalizing stereotype threat findings to high stakes testing
environments.89
These critiques take one of two forms: 1) analyzing preexisting data sets in which
researchers do not manipulate actual testing environments, or 2) externally manipu-
lating actual testing environments. Michael Cullen, professor of psychology from the
University of Minnesota, led a pair of studies representative of the former ap-
proach.90 To test the generalizability of stereotype threat, Cullen analyzed two mas-
sive data sets by comparing the “SAT-grade relationships in the college setting” and
“test-job performance relationships in a military setting.”91 Around the time of
Cullen’s first study, Lawrence Stricker and William Ward of the Educational Testing
Service undertook a project representative of the latter approach. Stricker and Ward
attempted to manipulate the level of threat in testing environments through the
strategic inclusion of pre-test questionnaires inquiring about race or gender.92
Regardless of their distinct methods, the researchers came to the similar conclu-
sion that high stakes testing environments failed to produce the same stereotype
threat effect observed in laboratory settings.93 To explain this outcome, the re-
searchers extended various hypotheses.94 One common hypothesis was that if stereo-
type is present in laboratory and applied settings, the motivation present in high-
stakes environments enables students to overcome otherwise debilitating effects.95
While these findings may cause us to pause, several studies reveal the fragility of
the conclusions drawn from the foregoing analyses.96 The most notable counter-
present information attempting to minimize threat by downplaying the importance of the test or by present-
ing factually untrue information suggesting no subgroup differences.”).
89. The genesis of these critiques emerged in a series of 2003 articles comprising four independent studies
that had attempted to determine the ecological validity of stereotype threat. See Claude M. Steele & Paul G.
Davies, Stereotype Threat and Employment Testing: A Commentary, 16 HUM. PERFORMANCE 311 (2003). Each
article concluded that “more research is needed.” James L. Farr, Introduction to the Special Issue: Stereotype
Threat Effects in Employment Settings, 16 HUM. PERFORMANCE 179 (2003).
90. See Cullen, Hardison, & Sackett, supra note 88; Michael J. Cullen, Shonna D. Waters & Paul R.
Sackett, Testing Stereotype Threat Predictions for Math-Identified and Non-Math-Identified Students by Gender,
19 HUM. PERFORMANCE 421 (2006).
91. The first data set included SATM score, SATV score and GPA of freshmen from thirteen universities.
The second came from the U.S. Army Selection and Classification Project, which included measurements of
performance on 10 subtests.
92. See Stricker & Ward, supra note 88.
93. See Cullen, Hardison & Sackett, supra note 89 (“[S]tereotype threat [was not] an appreciably impor-
tant explanatory mechanism for the Black-White differences in cognitive ability test scores.”); Stricker &
Ward, supra note 88 (concluding that the pre-test questionnaire failed to produce statistically significant
variation in performance).
94. Cullen hypothesized that salience of stereotype-relevant identity necessary to produce stereotype threat
was not present in applied settings. Reflecting their assumption that the pre-test questionnaire sufficiently
primed domain-relevant identities, Stricker and Ward conceded that high stakes environments may already
contain sufficient threat, such that the impact of the questionnaires was superfluous. Stricker & Ward, infra
note 102, at 686.
95. Id. at 686. But see Aronson et al., supra note 59.
96. Several studies claim to have observed stereotype threat effects in applied settings. See Jelte Wicherts,
Conor V. Dolan & David J. Hessen, Stereotype Threat and Group Differences in Test Performance: A Question of
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study comes from Professors Nguyen and Ryan, who analyzed over ten years of
research on stereotype threat.97 In finding that contextual factors moderate the im-
pact of threat,98 Nguyen and Ryan concluded that the entirety of the evidence
suggests stereotype threat impacts performance in applied settings.99 Translating this
finding to the SAT, they asserted that stereotype threat would under-measure the
talent of a minority student with average cognitive ability by about 50 points.100
In a separate article, Professors Danaher and Crandall directly responded to Stricker
and Ward’s analysis and conclusions.101 Danaher and Crandall re-examined the data
and concluded that a slight change in methodology revealed a significant stereotype
threat effect.102 They claimed that even with a small stereotype threat effect size, the
impact would be great. Contrary to Stricker and Ward, they predicted that removing
this additional burden could have led to a 5.9% increase in the number of female
students achieving a passing calculus score.103
Measurement Invariance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 696 (2005); Catherine Good, Joshua Aron-
son, & Jayne Anne Harder, Problems in the Pipeline: Stereotype Threat and Women’s Achievement in High-Level
Math Courses, 29 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 17 (2007) (“The pattern of results suggests that even
among the most highly qualified and persistent women in college mathematics, stereotype threat suppresses
test performance.”); MITCHELL CHANG ET AL., STEREOTYPE THREAT: UNDERMINING THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACIAL MINORITY FRESHMEN IN THE SCIENCES 30-31 (2009) (observing stereotype threat effects among
highly domain identified underrepresented minority students who experience negative racial experiences).
The anti-generalizability studies also problematically assume that stereotype-relevant identities are not
salient in high stakes settings absent explicit manipulation. See infra Part II; Claude M. Steele & Joshua
Aronson, Stereotype Threat Does not Live by Steele and Aronson (1995) Alone, 59 AM. PSYCH. 47, 48 (2004)
(“[T]he stereotype threat conditions, and not the no-threat conditions . . . produce group differences most
like those of real-life testing. Stereotype threat conditions represent the test as ability diagnostic, either en
passant or by saying nothing at all and relying on participants to know a test when they see one. It is the
no-threat conditions that are unlike real-life testing. They present the tests nondiagnostic of the participants’
ability or of their group’s ability—in stark contrast to real life testing situations.”); Walton & Spencer, supra
note 31, at 1133 (“Because such work does not remove psychological threat, it tests only whether, in control
conditions, one measure is completed in more threatening circumstances and is therefore more biased than
the other.”); Wicherts, Dolan & Hessen, supra, at 697 (challenging the assumptions underlying Cullen’s
conclusions).
97. See Nguyen & Ryan, supra note 64.
98. For instance, Nguyen and Ryan found that stereotype threat effects are more severe vis-a`-vis racial
stereotypes than gender stereotypes. Id. at 1327.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1330. Standard deviation for the SAT is around 100 points. See http://www.collegeboard.com/
prod_downloads/about/news_info/cbsenior/yr2004/2004_CBSNR_total_group.pdf.
101. Compare Kelly Danaher & Christian S. Crandall, Stereotype Threat in Applied Settings Re-Examined,
38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1639 (2008) (questioning whether the pre-test questionnaire was sufficient to
independently make race salient in the high stakes testing environment), with Lawrence J. Stricker & William
C. Ward, Stereotype Threat in Applied Settings Re-Examined: A Reply; 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1656
(2008) (responding to a critique of the methods used in an earlier study refuting the claim that removing
questions about gender or ethnicity on high-stakes tests would remove stereotype threat).
102. See Danaher & Crandall, supra note 101, at 1643 (“Stricker and Ward . . . did not accept any effect
unless it showed p  .05 in the overall ANOVA; p  .05 for planned comparisons . . . and also showed
  .10 or d . 20. By these criteria, the manipulations of holding off inquiries about race or gender until
after the test had no effect for the AP Calculus AB test or for any of the CPT scales. However, if one uses the
traditional p .05 for the overall ANOVA . . . and employs   .05 as a standard, we find several important
effects of the manipulation in Stricker and Ward’s data.”).
103. Nguyen argues that when combined with her meta-analysis, these findings suggest that vulnerable
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II. THE RECOMMENDATION
The science suggests that vulnerable, stereotype-threatened students experience a
measurement bias on the LSAT.104 Institutions moved by these findings now have
the “critical task . . . to determine how to account for this bias so as to make selection
decisions that are meritocratic and that do not discriminate against deserving people
from stereotyped groups.”105 In other words, having recognized that our “objective
processes” for evaluating merit are infected with a race-dependent mismeasurement,
how do we achieve fair measures that embody our color-blind ideal? I offer “rescal-
ing” as the prescription for this ailment. Rescaling is a race-conscious intervention
that corrects the mismeasured LSAT106 scores of stereotype-threatened students. I
open this Part with a description of rescaling. Following this introduction, I respond
to likely policy objections. Part III supplements this policy analysis with a constitu-
tional defense of rescaling.
A. Rescaling
An accurate understanding of rescaling demands defining the precise contours of
the underlying harm: stereotype threat-induced measurement bias. Stereotype threat
is neither past discrimination nor present structural or institutional discrimina-
tion.107 Rather, in causing a quantifiable, race-dependent under-measurement of
student talent, stereotype threat is identifiable discrimination in the here and now.
By relying on test scores that have been skewed by stereotype threat, admissions
offices use a metric that undervalues the merit of talented Black and Latino/a stu-
dents. This race-dependent mismeasure contravenes the goal of a neutral, color-
blind, and individualized review of each applicant.108 Moreover, the harm of this
process defect is not limited to those students denied admission as a result of mismea-
surement. In systematically excluding qualified Black and Latino/a students, law
schools undermine the attainment of diverse student bodies. The few Black and
Latino/a students who pass through the gates consequently face additional and unique
race-dependent burdens associated with their depleted numbers and token status.109
test takers are likely to experience an underperformance in high-stakes testing environments. See Nguyen &
Ryan, supra note 64, at 1330.
104. See Walton & Spencer, supra note 30, at 1137 (“[S]tandard measures of academic performance
underestimate the ability and potential of ethnic minority students and of women in quantitative fields.”).
105. Id.
106. Law schools may soon have the option to terminate reliance on the LSAT. The American Bar
Association (ABA) currently requires the LSAT for law school accreditation. However, a recent report citing
problems associated with the LSAT suggests that this requirement may change. See ABA May Drop LSAT
Requirement, Jan. 14, 2011, available at: http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/14/aba_may_end_
requirement_that_law_schools_use_lsat. Considering the interests motivating law school decisionmaking,
universal abandonment of the LSAT is unlikely. See West-Faulcon, supra note 29 (arguing the law school
rankings incentivize reliance on LSAT scores).
107. I am not arguing that institutions should ignore these broader mechanisms of subordination and
exclusion. However, as identifiable racial discrimination in the here and now, stereotype threat-produced
measurement bias reflects the particular harm recognized by modern antidiscrimination law. See infra Part III.
108. See id.
109. See infra Part II.C.
244 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. [Vol. 3:231
Additionally, tokenism produces key ingredients necessary to trigger stereotype threat
within the law school. Thus, correcting this measurement bias not only remedies a
fair measures defect at the moment of admission, but also prevents the vicious cycle
that unwarranted exclusion perpetuates.
As a remedy for stereotype threat-induced measurement bias, law schools that
adopt my rescaling proposal would add four points to the LSAT score of all Black
applicants with a score of 150 and above. Considering that stereotype threat affects
Black and Latino/a applicants, it may seem odd that my proposal only engages the
mismeasurement of Black students. I articulate rescaling solely in terms of Black
applicants in order to maximize the clarity of the proposal. Institutions adopting a
rescaling policy would be able to implement a mechanism that corrects the scores of
Latino/a applicants in addition to Black applicants.110 In general, rescaling has three
defining features. First, it is expressly race-conscious. Since the underlying measure-
ment bias is race-dependent, effectively targeting susceptible students demands a
racially attentive policy.111 Second, rescaling entails a specific numerical adjustment
that corrects the measurement bias associated with stereotype threat. This correction
produces a more accurate account of student merit. The 4 points correspond to the
mean effect size of stereotype threat on vulnerable Black students.112 Third, rescaling
utilizes a 150-point floor. This component of the policy arises from the recognition
that stereotype threat-induced underperformance necessitates a baseline ability. The
floor thus ensures that rescaling is limited to students suffering from a measurement
bias.113
The following numbers add texture to rescaling. In 2008-2009, Black students
had a mean LSAT score of 142 (SD  8.40).114 In contrast, White students had a
mean score of 152 (SD 8.96).115 Color-blind admissions policies that rely on the
LSAT inevitably reproduce this disparity through the production of a student body
characterized by Black underrepresentation.116 While stereotype threat may not ac-
count for this entire performance gap, the best measure predicts that vulnerable
110. Since stereotype threat does not equally impact individuals from all negatively stereotyped groups,
the precise rescaling recommendation will potentially differ depending on the particular racial identity.
111. For a critique of race neutral alternatives, see infra Part III.C.4.
112. The four point recommendation derives from personal conversations with Professor Rachel Godsil,
Seton Hall School of Law, concerning the results of a study that observed the mean effect size of stereotype
threat on MCAT-takers. Extrapolating the mean effect size from the MCAT to the LSAT suggests a mini-
mum mean effect of four points for vulnerable Black LSAT-takers. Since researchers have yet to measure the
impact of stereotype threat on LSAT-takers, this is the most analogous measure currently available.
113. I elected a 150-point floor because it corresponds to one standard deviation above the mean LSAT
score for Black students. In other words, I am using one standard deviation as a proxy for students in the
vanguard of the group. While some may argue that this number is arbitrary, it is likely that the floor is too high
and some students scoring below a 150 still suffer from stereotype threat.
114. See supra note 21.
115. Id.
116. It is arguable that “color-blind” admissions policies have always taken race into account. In some
instances, this occurs by granting hard points on a “race-neutral” basis that carry a “race-dependent” func-
tional effect. See Tim Wise, Whites Swim in Racial Preference, AlterNet (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://
www.alternet.org/story/15223/ (illustrating how the University of Michigan’s undergraduate application
allotted points along a “race-neutral” axis that in effect could only be attained by white students).
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Black LSAT-takers experience a four-point undermeasure of talent.117 Thus, the
average Black student scoring a 158 has the same talent as the average White student
scoring a 162. We can think of these four points as a direct manifestation of the
“pioneer tax” we encountered in Part I.118 In the zero-sum context of law school
admissions, this four-point tax on Black students functions as an informal, unspoken
four-point boost for White students. If formally contained with an institution’s
admissions criteria, such a policy would be universally condemned on policy and
constitutional grounds. Considering our hostility toward such a system, why should
we find an informal, yet functionally equivalent “tax” to be any more acceptable?
Rescaling simply eliminates this tax.
Consider the following hypothetical: Imagine we live in a truly color-blind world,
wholly devoid of racial contingencies. Race is nothing more than phenotype, a
characteristic that plays no role in an individual’s access to resources or susceptibility
to race-dependent psychological barriers. Now consider the constitutional implica-
tions of several different admissions policies. World One: Law School X adds four
points to the LSAT scores of all White applicants. Is this action constitutional?
Clearly not. World Two: Law School X gives a random fifty percent of White
applicants four additional points on the LSAT. Constitutional? Again, indisputably
not. World Three: Law School X grants a random fifty percent of White applicants a
random bump from zero to four points on the LSAT. Constitutional? This still
presents us with a formal distribution of points awarded solely on the basis of race,
which in a world devoid of racial contingencies constitutes an unconstitutional act.
World Four: One final iteration. Law School X grants a random zero to four-point
bump to all White applicants with an LSAT score of 150 or higher. Constitutionally,
has anything significant changed between World One and World Four? Law School
X still awards points on the basis of race. In every world, color-blindness has been
compromised.
What is the relevance of these hypotheticals? The four worlds, which frame stereo-
type threat from the perspective of the White beneficiary, cleanly map onto our best
understandings of this phenomenon. World Four resembles contemporary prac-
tices.119 The random provision of points and the 150-point baseline reflects the
understanding that stereotype threat will not affect all individuals from a negatively
stereotyped group equally. In this way, World Four provides a more accurate depic-
tion of contemporary practices than the color-blind ideal many of us espouse. And
we already recognized that World Four is not easily distinguishable from World
One, where we saw a blatant preference for all White students. If this is the world in
which we live, how could it not compel a remedy? And if it does not compel a
remedy, does the Constitution prohibit one because it is race-conscious?
The inability to draw clean distinctions between World One and World Four also
117. See supra note 112.
118. See supra note 74.
119. Considering four points corresponds to the mean effect size of stereotype threat on Black applicants,
see supra note 112, a more accurate account would have the random allocation of points exceed the four-point
ceiling currently in the hypothetical.
246 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. [Vol. 3:231
calls into question traditional narratives concerning race, merit, and the status quo.120
Kang and Banaji distill this concern, suggesting that it “should give us pause as we
confront the fact that arbitrary environmental cues can trigger implicit cognitive
processes that interfere with or facilitate performance on seemingly objective mea-
sures.”121 What “we thought to be fair assessments of ‘merit’ . . . turn out to be
[racially tinged] mismeasurements—not because of explicit animus but because of
hidden mental processes that by their nature cannot reach conscious awareness.”122
This means that the LSAT, even if administered in a uniform fashion to all students,
fails as a neutral measure of talent.123
The harm flowing from race-dependent mismeasures is not limited to the moment
of decision making. Rather, reliance on biased measures topples the first domino in
a vicious cycle. Notwithstanding stereotype threat, a small number of Black and
Latino/a students are still able to gain admission. However, as a result of the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of qualified Black and Latino/a students, those who enter face
additional burdens unique to token status.124 Beyond independent challenges associ-
ated with severe underrepresentation, tokenism has the potential to trigger the same
stereotype threat effects that produced the initial mismeasures. Thus, process defects
at the moment of decisionmaking sew the ground for subsequent race-dependent
obstacles that majoritarian students never encounter.
B. Policy Objection: Overprediction
One inevitable objection to rescaling is the claim of overprediction.125 Overpredic-
tion is the notion that standardized tests actually overpredict the performance of
120. See generally Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1996) (“Competing narratives drive the affirmative action debate . . . Each story
proceeds from different assumptions about the baseline of decision making: how fair, unbiased, and merit-
driven is the system in which affirmative action operates?”).
121. Kang & Banaji, supra note 13, at 1089. See also William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender
Bias on the LSAT and Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 26
(2000) (“Stereotype threat research suggests that the LSAC’s simplistic definition of standardized conditions
obscures how a history of sexism, racism and classism can facilitate so-called standardized conditions which
further privilege White and male and affluent (and therefore especially affluent White male) test takers.”).
122. Kang & Banaji, supra note 13, at 1089.
123. See STEELE, supra note 15, at 60 (“The reality of stereotype threat also made the point that places like
classrooms, university campuses, standardized-testing rooms, or competitive-running tracks, though seem-
ingly the same for everybody, are, in fact, different places for different people.”); See also Expert Report of
David M. White, Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-75928) at 17
(“Nevertheless, the different ways students take tests can affect their scores without reflecting their underlying
ability to read or reason. Simply giving the same test to all applicants cannot ensure that all applicants will take
the same test.”).
124. See infra, Part II.C.
125. Another likely critique would follow the logic of mismatch theory. Mismatch theory posits that
race-conscious admissions policies counter-intuitively reduce the number of Black law students who eventu-
ally become practicing attorneys. See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in Ameri-
can Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 474-77 (2004) (“The number of black lawyers produced by American
law schools each year and subsequently passing the bar would probably increase if those schools collectively
stopped using racial preferences . . . the absolute number of black law graduates passing the bar on their first
attempt . . . would be much larger under a race-blind regime than under the current system of preferences.”).
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negatively stereotyped groups.126 Contrary to the claim underlying this Article,
overprediction asserts that the LSAT actually inflates minority talent.127 This claim
stems from the observation that when controlling for entering indicia of ability, as
measured by the LSAT, well prepared and highly motivated Black students fare
worse than their White counterparts in future academic performance.128 While the
ubiquity of this phenomenon is evident, it is important to note that recent reports
have begun to question whether overprediction accurately describes minority perfor-
mance.129
Even accepting the claim of overprediction, there are multiple ways to interpret
For a detailed critique of mismatch theory, see andre douglas pond cummings, “Open Water”: Affirmative
Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators: A Response to Richard Sander, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795,
799 n.22, Part III (2006). See also Cheryl I. Harris & William C. Kidder, The Black Student Mismatch Myth in
Legal Education: The Systematic Flaws in Richard Sander’s Affirmative Action Study, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER
EDUC. 102, 103 (2004/5), (relying on more typical data from 2003 and 2004 reveals that eliminating
“affirmative action would slash African American law school admissions by 24 percent and 33 percent,
respectively”); Jesse Rothstein & Albert Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What do Racial
Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 707 (2008) (“The number of black law graduates would fall by 60
percent, while the numbers of bar entrants and large-firm associates would each fall by half.”); David L.
Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical
Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005); Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does
Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005) (utilizing the
same data sets as Sander to conclude that eliminating race-conscious admissions programs would result in a
net reduction of Black attorneys); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 38 (1997). Sander’s argument is a contemporary reincarnation of past “mismatch” theses
promulgated in opposition to affirmative action. See Harris & Kidder, supra.
126. See, e.g., STEVEN FARRON, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HOAX (2005); Gail L. Heriot &
Christopher T. Wonnell, Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying Glass: A Defense of the LSAT Against Recent
Charges of Bias, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 467 (2002/3); Leonard Ramist et al., Using Achievement Tests/SAT II:
Subject Tests to Demonstrate Achievement and Predict College Grades: Sex, Language, Ethnic and Parental
Education Groups, College Board Research Report No. 2001-5 (2001).
127. Overprediction assumes that Black and Latino/a students are less qualified than Whites with identical
LSAT scores. See Rogers Elliott et al., The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly Selective
Institutions, 37 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 681, 684 (1996) (“At White-majority institutions non-Asian minorities
are, by virtue of race-preferential admission policies, at an often serious disadvantage with respect to validly
predictive indices of talent, and if equally developed ability predicts equal persistence, unequally developed
ability should predict differential persistence.”).
128. See e.g., JAMES EARL DAVIS, CAMPUS CLIMATE, GENDER, AND ACHIEVEMENT OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (1998) (“[T]oo many [Black students] exhibit a marked decrease in performance from
their high school grades over and beyond what is generally expected for adjustment to college level work.”);
Steele & Aronson, supra note 33, at 798 (“At every level of preparation as measured by a standardized
test—for example, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)—Black students with that score have poorer subse-
quent achievement—GPA, retention rates, time to graduation, and so on—than White students with that
score.”).
129. See, e.g., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES: ANALYSIS OF DIFFER-
ENT PREDICTION OF LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE BY RACIAL/ETHNIC SUBGROUPS BASED ON 2005-2007
ENTERING LAW SCHOOL CLASSES (2009), available at http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Research/TR/TR-
09-02.pdf. The results “provided no evidence that LSAT scores . . . unfairly predict future law school perfor-
mance for any racial/ethnic group.” Id. See also Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 125, at 711-12 (“There is little
evidence of underperformance among black students with entering LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs
above those of the twentieth-percentile . . . [T]here is no evidence of black underperformance on any employ-
ment outcomes.”).
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these findings.130 One is to assume that standardized tests overpredict Black and
Latino/a talent. An alternative explanation is that once in college or law school,
something prohibits Black and Latino/a students from reaching their full poten-
tial.131
C. Alternative Explanations: Tokenism and Racially Hostile Environments
“The problem is not so much the entry; it’s what happens while you’re there . . .”132
As with other institutions, the University of Michigan Law School observed that
its minority students underperformed relative to their White counterparts.133 Michi-
gan had recognized that underperformance was partly due to the lack of a “critical
mass”134 of minority students. Absent a critical mass of non-White students, educa-
tional spaces such as law school classes have the tendency to produce racially hostile
environments,135 which impose race-dependent burdens on minority students.136
Similar to stereotype threat,137 these race-dependent burdens uniquely hinder the
130. See, e.g., Walton & Spencer, supra note 30, at 1133 (arguing that overprediction may exist not from
overmeasurements, but rather because the “the level of psychological threat increases at each rung of the
educational ladder, for instance as students become more anonymous and as they reach the edge of their
abilities”). See also, Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit, and
Achievement, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 82 (2007).
131. If using SAT or LSAT scores as a reference, it is likely these scores already involve measurement
defects. Thus, a more accurate measure of “potential” would be a rescaled score, in which stereotype threat is
taken into account.
132. Katherine S. Mangan, Does Affirmative Action Hurt Black Law Students?, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Nov. 12, 2004, at 35 (quoting Harvard Law School graduate Kathy Hart, who is Black).
133. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
134. Critical mass refers to the “concentration of a ‘meaningful’ number of underrepresented students
necessary to create an environment in which such students can fully engage in the classroom as individuals
rather than felling like they have to be a spokesperson for their race or defy stereotypes.” Deidre M. Bowen,
Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197,
1199. n.7 (2010).
135. Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev refer to “threatening intellectual environments” to describe spaces that “can
activate the threatening effects of gender stereotypes.” Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A Threatening
Intellectual Environment: Why Females are Susceptible to Experiencing Problem Solving Deficits in the Presence of
Males, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 365, 365 (2000). My use of the term connotes the same meaning, yet with respect to
race. Allen and Solorzano have identified fourteen characteristics of negative racial climates that exist in the
absence of a critical mass. Examples include: “Students of color experience numerous overt instances of race
discrimination; however, the negative campus racial climate . . . actually originates from more subtle, covert
racial incidents”; and “The negative campus racial climate exacts psychological and behavioral tolls on
students of color that interfere with their academic achievement.” Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solorzano,
Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan
Law School, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 237, 299 (2001). For a more detailed description of critical mass and
racially hostile environments, see Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law
Firms: Reevaluating Kanter’s Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 43-48 (2000); Sylvia Hurtado et al.,
Enacting Diverse Learning Environments: Improving the Climate for Racial/Ethnic Diversity in Higher Educa-
tion, ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report 26 (1999); Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professional Responsi-
bility of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2002).
136. See Allen & Solorzano, supra note 135, at 246 (observing that undergraduate students of color felt
that their colleges are racially charged atmospheres wherein their presence is questioned, yet the presence of
Whites on campus is not questioned).
137. See Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African
Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 810 (1995) (“Although probably in the same family of
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ability of qualified and talented token students to reach their potential.138 Further-
more, majority students never have to bear these burdens.139
Professor Timothy Clydesdale describes the divergent experiences of token and
majority students as “a forked river, with one side offering a challenging and often
dangerous white-water rapids course, the other side a swift but smooth current, and
an entry gate that variously restricts access to the river.”140 Three characteristics
unique to tokens facilitate this divergence:141 super-visibility,142 polarization,143 and
distortion of individual characteristics.144 As relative underrepresentation rises, the
debilitating effects of these characteristics increase.145 While these burdens occur
across a variety of settings, spaces that maintain pervasive negative stereotypes about
tokens are the most likely to produce racially hostile environments. Well-known
examples include the following: Black males in traditionally White colleges;146 under-
effects as stereotype threat, token status would be expected to disrupt cognitive functioning even when the
token individual is not targeted by a performance-relevant stereotype, as with, for example, a White man in a
group of women solving math problems. Nor do stereotype threat effects require token status . . . [i]n real life,
of course, these two processes may often co-occur, as for the Black in an otherwise non-Black classroom. They
are nonetheless, distinct processes.”).
138. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord & Delia S. Saenz, Memory Deficits and Memory Surfeits: Differential
Cognitive Consequences of Tokenism for Tokens and Observers, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918
(1985) (observing the token status can produce short term memory strain).
139. See Brian Owsley, Black Ivy: An African-American Perspective on Law School, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
REV. 501, 524 (1997) (“It’s funny how whites can turn on and off this whole [racial] dialogue thing, but once
I get started, I’m screwed up and freaked out by it I can’t concentrate or study.”)
140. Timothy Clydesdale, A Forked River Run Through Law School: Toward Understanding Race, Gender,
Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 712 (2004).
141. Contemporary understandings stem from the 1977 work of Rosabeth Kanter, who analyzed the
experiences of token women in male-dominated workspaces. See Rosabeth M. Kanter, Some Effects of Propor-
tions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966 (1977)
(defining tokens as members of groups making up 15% or less of the workforce). Kanter’s hypothesis, which
has been extended beyond gender, is that “women in the setting with fewer female colleagues (1) will do less
well academically (performance pressure), (2) will be less integrated into the law school (social isolation), and
(3) will be more likely to demonstrate traditional female preferences in study strategies and career choices (role
entrapment).” Spangler et al., Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter’s Hypothesis, 84 AM. J. SOC. 160,
162 (1978).
142. See Spangler et al., supra note 141, 161 (1978) (explaining that tokens are “over-observed,” creating
additional performance pressures unique to minority members).
143. See id. (explaining that characteristics distinguishing minority and majority group members gain
increased salience, even when irrelevant to task performance, leading to isolation of the minority member).
144. See id. (explaining that majority members impose stereotypes on individual tokens, failing to accept
behavior that challenges stereotypes).
145. See Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra note 135, at 369 (“[P]erformance deficits tend to increase as the
relative number of [majority members] increases.”); Spangler et al., supra note 142 (finding that performance
pressure hindered the performance of women more severely when women represented 20% of the student
body than when they represented 33%).
146. See, e.g., James Earl Davis, College in Black and White: Campus Environment and Academic Achieve-
ment of African American Males, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 620 (1994) (observing that exposure to prejudice at
predominantly White institutions is particularly pernicious for Black males’ social and academic develop-
ment); DAVIS, supra note 129, at 4 (“Black students at predominantly white colleges report that racial
discrimination occurs with much greater frequency there than at other types of institutions.”); JACQUELINE
FLEMING, BLACKS IN COLLEGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STUDENTS’ SUCCESS IN BLACK AND WHITE
INSTITUTIONS (1984) (observing that exposure to prejudice on campus has a significant effect on black
students’ cognitive and affective development at predominantly white institutions).
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represented women in law school;147 minority students in law school;148 and tokens
in elite law firms.149 It is thus not surprising that law schools, which persist as spaces
where Black and Latino/a students continue to be racialized as unqualified and
untalented,150 remain particularly dangerous for underrepresented students of color.
Professor Deidre Bowen recently provided new insight into the relationship be-
tween tokenism, hostile environments and higher education.151 She conducted a
comparative study analyzing the experiences of Black and Latino/a students in states
that allow affirmative action and states that prohibit the practice.152 While overt acts
of racism continue to be widespread, Professor Bowen discovered that Black and
Latino/a students are twice as likely to receive discriminatory treatment in states that
have banned affirmative action.153 Token status was a central factor contributing to
the discrimination. In contrast to minority students who had never been solo in a
classroom, solo minorities were four times as likely to experience overt racism from
other students, and twice as likely to experience such racism from faculty.154 Mirror-
ing earlier work, Bowen’s findings lend empirical support for the claim that as their
overall representation falls, tokens face an increase in race-dependent burdens.155
Stereotype threat and tokenism are integrally connected phenomena. White law
students never confront either of these race-dependent burdens. In contrast, stereo-
type threat and tokenism function as cyclical and mutually reinforcing burdens that
trap Black and Latino/a students in a vicious cycle. Beginning with the LSAT,
147. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994) (“[T]he experience of women in the aggregate differs markedly from that of their
males peers.”).
148. See, e.g., Brian Owsley, Black Ivy: An African-American Perspective on Law School, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. REV. 501, 524 (1997); Cecil J. Hunt, Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar
Performance, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 721 (1996).
149. See, e.g., Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography: Women’s Social Construction of Gender Identity at
Work, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 589 (1995). But see KAY DEAUX & JOSEPH ULLMAN, WOMEN OF STEEL (1983).
150. See, e.g., Kendra Fox-Davis, A Badge of Inferiority: One Law Student’s Story of a Racially Hostile
Educational Environment, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 98 (2010); Elizabeth M. Iglesias et al., Labor and Employment
in the Academy—A Critical Look at the Ivory Tower, 6 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129 (2002);
Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories
and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (1994). This literature has also discussed the adverse impact
of tokenism on professors of color. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991); Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J.
365 (1991).
151. See Deidre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning
Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197 (2010). See also Allen Solorzano, supra note 135 (completing an
empirical study of racial climate at the University of Michigan Law School and its “feeder” institutions).
152. Bowen’s work also challenges the common assertion that affirmative action stamps its beneficiaries
with a badge of inferiority. Unlike this narrative suggests, racial hostility is most rampant in states that have
positively banned race-conscious admissions. See Bowen, supra note 151.
153. See id., at 1221-22 tbl.2, 1234 (finding that “[s]tudents who attend schools in anti-affirmative action
states find themselves engaged in an unfriendly environment. Despite being admitted on purely white,
normative admissions standards, these students were more likely than any other group to encounter . . .
open hostility, internal stigma, and external stigma.”).
154. Id. at 1228-29.
155. See Allen & Solorzano, supra note 135, at 301 (“Women and students of color experience these
campuses as hostile environments, places where they are either not welcome or are welcome only in clearly
delimited, subordinate status.”).
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stereotype threat produces a measurement bias that undermeasures the talent of
Black and Latino/a students. As a result of the disproportionate exclusion of qualified
Black and Latino/a students that follows, those who enter must now pay a new,
race-dependent “token-tax.”156 In addition to creating independent challenges, to-
ken status increases the salience of race within a law school environment that contin-
ues to attach negative stereotypes to students of color. This combination produces
high levels of stigma consciousness, and thereby reproduces the conditions ripe for
stereotype threat.157 We have thus completed the cycle. Rescaling, as a means to
promote fair measures and effectively mitigate severe underrepresentation, looks
more essential than ever.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Rescaling: A Constitutional Challenge
Considering the traction of color-blindness,158 an institution that adopts rescaling
will face immediate legal challenge. In anticipation of such challenges, the remainder
of this Article offers a defense of rescaling’s constitutionality. To limit abstraction,
assume that UCLA School of Law implements rescaling.159 A constitutional chal-
lenge will likely mirror those brought against the University of Michigan in 2003.160
As a state institution, UCLA must demonstrate that rescaling conforms to the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.161
The first battle will be fought over the appropriate level of review. Considering the
Supreme Court’s hostility toward “racial classifications,”162 rescaling appears des-
tined for strict scrutiny. Still, I argue that this is a premature concession, as the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is far less clear than it initially appears. First,
the Court has never held that the mere mention of race within a statute or policy
categorically triggers strict scrutiny. For example, civil rights laws expressly mention
race but have never been subjected to this level of review.163 Thus, rescaling’s attentive-
ness to race is not the end of the discussion, but only the beginning.
156. I intend “token-tax” to parallel Claude Steele’s “pioneer tax.” See Steele, supra note 75.
157. See Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra note 136, at 365, 369 (“Simply placing high-achieving women in an
environment in which men outnumbered them can cause them to experience performance deficits in a
stereotype problem-solving domain.”).
158. See supra note 10. Additionally, see Ward Connerly’s crusade against affirmative action, available at
http://www.acri.org/ward_bio.html.
159. I choose UCLA School of Law because it is my home institution. This is just a hypothetical.
160. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Because
UCLA resides in California, rescaling opponents would also claim that the policy violates the California
Constitution. See CAL. Const. art.1 § 31. I choose not to address the merits of this challenge for two reasons.
First, only four states currently have anti-affirmative action laws. Thus, the argument’s relevance to a national
audience is minimal. Second, my defense of rescaling is premised on the notion that the policy actually
promotes color-blindness. Thus, rescaling would arguably place UCLA in greater compliance with California
state law than it currently sits.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
162. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government
‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”).
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
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Notwithstanding what the Court often claims, not all racial classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny.164 This inconsistent treatment arises from the normative
judgment that racial classifications produce a legally cognizable harm only within
certain contexts.165 It is thus important to distill the rationale underlying the Court’s
decision to apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the domain relevant to
rescaling: higher education.166 In the realms of employment and higher education,
the Court’s skepticism towards racial classifications arises from the notion that such
action represents an inherently preferential repudiation of race-neutral, meritocratic
criteria.167 When viewing race as an arbitrary characteristic,168 allocating resources
on a race-conscious basis appears to contravene color-blindness by favoring “one race
over another.”169 From this baseline, the harm arising from the use of racial classifica-
tions is the denial of a neutral process and unfair redistribution of scarce resources.
The harm is not simply making distinctions on the basis of race.
Well-known cases from the realms of employment and education exemplify this
conceptualization of harm. In Richmond v. Croson, Justice O’Connor struck down
Richmond’s thirty percent minority set–aside not because race was present, but
because she believed that the program allocated a race-dependent benefit.170 This
sentiment is not new. First emerging in The Civil Rights Cases,171 and then reappear-
ing in Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, the Court has historically associated racial
classifications with preference whenever a public benefit or resource is at stake.172
same right . . . and full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”)
(emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“All citizens . . . shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”) (emphasis added).
164. Racial classifications in the domain of criminal justice are not subject to strict scrutiny. See Brown v.
City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that police use of racial classifications is not subject to
strict scrutiny). See also, Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine
and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001).
165. Compare City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d at 772 (holding that strict scrutiny in the criminal justice context
is inapplicable because it would chill police protection and “likely undermine the strict scrutiny standard
itself ”), with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980)) (“[R]acial
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact[ing review].”).
166. In the public school integration context, for instance, the mere use of racial classifications is a harm in
and of itself. See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
167. A majority of the Court has never held that the racial classifications produce a legally cognizable harm
in these contexts merely from the mention of race. Still, a plurality of the Court firmly espouses this pro-
foundly color-blind view. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm
favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens
on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
168. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(articulating the notion of formal race).
169. Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989).
170. Id. (“[R]eview under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification.”).
171. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged from slavery . . .
there must be some stage in progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws.”).
172. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306;
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
2011] 253COLOR-BLINDNESS AND STEREOTYPING
Similar to that of Justice O’Connor, Justice Powell’s hostility toward racial quotas
was not founded upon the mere presence of race. Rather, it arose from the understand-
ing that admissions decisions based on race contravened merit by extending an
unjustifiable preference to otherwise unqualified minority applicants.173 As a result
of this preference, Justice Powell feared that “innocent [White applicants would have
had] to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.”174
This characterization of the policy was not inevitable. However, it arose from the
way in which the UC Davis Medical School framed its own program. The medical
school justified its policy as a response to societal discrimination, not as a mechanism
to achieve more meritocratic admissions standards.175 If the medical school had
taken the latter route, preference concerns may have dissipated.176 Justice Powell
emphasized this point by distinguishing Bakke from a series of opinions in which the
Court had not applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications.177 These cases involved
policies designed to cure specific identifiable discrimination.178 The precedent cases
thus entailed a close nexus between the remedy and the underlying harm.179 Due to
the absence of such a nexus in Bakke, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny to a policy
he viewed as inherently preferential.180
Following the foregoing reasoning, rescaling need not trigger strict scrutiny. The
goal of remedying race-dependent measurement biases implicates race in a way
societal discrimination justifications never could. By focusing on societal discrimina-
tion, the medical school implicitly accepted that the minority students who would
have been excluded but for the challenged policy were underqualified and undeserv-
ing of admission (or at least less-deserving than higher scoring White applicants).
Thus, the policy never escaped the Court’s historic association of race-consciousness
with preference. However, rescaling is fundamentally different. It is not founded
upon the notion that a lack of resources, motivation, or culture place Black and
Latino/a students behind their White counterparts. Rather, rescaling is premised on
the notion that stereotype threat produces an undermeasurement of Black and
Latino/a talent on admissions exams. This is a repudiation of the tools, not the
students. By mitigating a quantifiable, race-dependent process defect at the particu-
lar site of mismeasurement, rescaling contains the tight nexus lauded by Justice
Powell. Understanding rescaling in this way suggests that such a policy warrants the
173. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-90 (“[T]here are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of
preference itself.”).
174. Id. at 298.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 306 n.43.
177. Id. at 300-01 (discussing school desegregation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination
cases).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 301 (“[W]e approved a retroactive award of seniority to a class of Negro truckdrivers who had
been the victims of discrimination—not just by society at large, but by the respondent in that case.”).
180. Id. Justice Powell never discarded his use of “preference” when describing the precedent cases. Even
when characterizing the remedies as dealing directly with identifiable discrimination, the notion that a
counter-measure was not inherently preferential remained beyond the scope of Justice Powell’s opinion.
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limited level of judicial skepticism extended in the precedent cases, not the strict
scrutiny applied in Bakke.
Still, in light of the modern Court’s growing hostility toward any racially attentive
policy and apparent inability to differentiate between race-conscious programs that
dismantle structures of inequality from policies that produce inequality,181 it is
unlikely the Court will apply anything less than strict scrutiny to rescaling.182 In the
remainder of this Article, I argue that rescaling withstands even the Court’s most
rigid review.
B. Fatal in Fact?183 Compelling Interest
To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the chal-
lenged policy is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.184 The
Court has identified student body diversity and remedying past discrimination
as sufficiently compelling interests.185 Thus, institutions of higher education no
longer face the challenge of establishing this initial prong.186 The challenge arises in
181. See Ricci v. Destefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (suggesting that all government employment deci-
sions that take race into account will be subject to strict scrutiny). For a relevant critique of this form of
jurisprudence, see Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010).
182. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (“Racial and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent
examination without regard to these additional characteristics.”). In her rationale for the application of strict
scrutiny with benign racial classification, Justice O’Connor stated that “the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
183. Professor Adam Winkler conducted an empirical analysis to determine the veracity of this now
common idiom. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). His findings demonstrate that “fatal in fact” may be more
myth than reality. However, while federal courts have upheld a substantial number of race-conscious em-
ployment and admissions policies, these policies have almost universally arisen in response to specific in-
stances of identifiable discrimination or the goal of diversity in higher education. Thus, “fatal-in-fact” remains
an accurate description for race-conscious policies that do not fit neatly into these boxes.
184. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356.
185. See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-22 (2007).
186. Two additional conceptualizations of the compelling interest underlying rescaling deserve brief
mention. The first is an interest in avoiding Title VI liability. See West-Faulcon, supra note 30, at 1082
(“[A]ffirmative action-less universities are admitting so few minorities that the racial disparities in admissions
to those institutions establishes a rebuttable legal presumption of a Title VI disparate impact claim.”).
Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon explains that “[a]ssuming the Fourteenth Amendment permits institutions
to use race-conscious admissions policies for the remedial purpose of avoiding Title VI liability, in such a
circumstance, remedial affirmative action is simply taking race into account [as] equalizing treatment.” Cf.
Calhoun, supra note 136. The second conceptualization comes from Zatz’s nonaccommodation theory. See
Noah Zatz, Managing the Macaw, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1389 (2009) (“[N]onaccommodation theory
does not require discriminatory intent, that is, internal causation. Instead, an employer may ‘discriminate’
even though its decisionmaking process is ‘neutral’ in the sense that it ignores an employee’s protected trait.”).
Nonaccommodation suggests that an institution discriminates against an applicant, even if the admissions
process is “neutral,” in the sense that it ignores an applicant’s protected trait. In this case, ignoring the fact that
reliance on the LSAT bestows an unequal burden on vulnerable Black and Latino/a students would qualify as
discrimination. Cf. Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification Theory, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (2003)
(suggesting the compelling interests underlying race-conscious employment practices designed to prevent
workplace discrimination arise from dramatic gender or racial imbalances).
2011] 255COLOR-BLINDNESS AND STEREOTYPING
demonstrating that the chosen policy is narrowly tailored to further one of these
ends.187
Traditionally, the Court has understood attaining diversity and remedying discrimi-
nation as compelling interests that exist independently of each other. Neither interest
alone wholly encapsulates rescaling, which is motivated by the interdependent rela-
tionship between fair measures defects and the underrepresentation of minority
students. An accurate portrayal of rescaling thus necessitates situating the policy
within the dual goals of attaining diversity and remedying discrimination. Without
this comprehensive understanding of the state’s interests, rescaling becomes vulner-
able to narrow tailoring challenges that fail to recognize that the policy is pursuing
both goals simultaneously.188 In the analysis that follows, I demonstrate that the two
established compelling interests form a natural union that embodies the dual motiva-
tions underlying rescaling. Beyond providing a secure foundation for the narrow
tailoring analysis, the marriage of attaining diversity and remedying discrimination
produces a hybrid compelling interest that is more persuasive than the sum of its
component parts.
Justifying rescaling solely on diversity grounds proves incomplete. While tradi-
tional diversity arguments encompass rescaling’s goal of achieving a critical mass of
underrepresented students,189 this is the extent of the commonality. Writing for the
Court in Grutter, Justice O’Connor’s articulation of diversity as a compelling interest
reflected a severely limited understanding of diversity’s core value. According to the
Court, diversity provides “educational benefits” by infusing a wide range of ideas and
perspectives into the classroom.190 In this regard, “educational benefits” refers to the
intangibles underrepresented minorities bring to the classroom setting. Thus, when
the Court identified racial diversity as a crucial component of any diversity project,
its rationale did not escape this basic logic.191 Limited in this sense, the Court
embraced the concept of a critical mass only as a method for ensuring the attainment
of educational benefits. Had the attainment of a critical mass been unrelated to such
benefits, Michigan’s policy would have amounted to nothing more than “outright
racial balancing,” a “patently unconstitutional” policy.192
187. See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) finding a lack of narrow
tailoring in public school integration plan).
188. The “fit” nature of strict scrutiny analysis necessitates comprehensive articulation of the compelling
interests underlying a policy. This is especially true in the context of race-consciousness since the Court is
particularly demanding of a tight nexus between means (narrow tailoring) and ends (compelling interest).
189. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
190. Id. at 330 (emphasizing that diversity serves the laudable goals of producing “cross-racial understand-
ing,” creating livelier classroom discussion, and “prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society”).
191. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (justifying the goal of a critical mass in terms of the “educational benefits”
that attach to such an end). For an example of the diversity rationale embodying at least part of the “critical
mass” side of the equation, see Expert Report of Kent D. Syverud, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821
No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[When] a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present,
racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint,’ but
rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”).
192. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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The rationale underlying the acceptance of diversity as a compelling interest in
Grutter provides a useful point of departure for this defense of rescaling. However,
focusing exclusively on the “educational benefits” conceptualization of diversity un-
necessarily limits the persuasiveness of diversity as a compelling interest. Without
discarding the Court’s notion of “educational benefits,” considering the dual motiva-
tions underlying rescaling reframes the value of diversity by focusing on the ex-
perience of underrepresented students. This reframing occurs by adding modern
understandings of the unique harms and challenges arising from token status to
traditional explanations for the need of a critical mass. Through this lens, critical
mass assumes the additional function of alleviating these burdens through the amelio-
ration of racially hostile environments. In other words, critical mass not only pro-
motes Justice O’Connor’s “educational benefits,” but also mitigates the race-
dependent “token-tax” associated with severe underrepresentation.
Rescaling’s role in the evolution of the diversity rationale does not end here.
Traditional diversity arguments assume that those students who are denied admis-
sion as a result of lower test scores are unqualified.193 Under this view, diversity and
meritocracy appear mutually exclusive. Thus, the Court perceives diversity policies as
antithetical to color-blindness. This understanding of diversity policies explains why
Justice O’Connor invokes “educational benefits” as a justification for Michigan’s
departure from merit and neutrality.194 Rescaling rejects this basic premise. While
the goal of a critical mass is essential to this policy, rescaling is principally concerned
with ensuring fair measures. It is founded upon the recognition that, as a conse-
quence of stereotype threat, the LSAT undermeasures the talent of Black and Latino/a
students. This foundational principle disrupts the diversity-meritocracy dichotomy
and avoids a zero sum analysis. Properly understood as correcting race-dependent
measurement biases, rescaling does not require sacrificing merit. Rather, it attains
diversity through the promotion of a more color-blind and meritocratic process.
Situating rescaling within this updated diversity rationale is only the first stage of
the compelling interest discussion. As rescaling’s fair measures goals comprise an
explicit antidiscrimination project, this analysis must include our second compelling
interest: remedying past discrimination.195
Prior to Grutter,196 remedying past discrimination was the only firmly established
193. See Uma M. Jayakumar, Can Higher Education Meet the Needs of an Increasingly Diverse and Global
Society? Campus Diversity and Cross-Cultural Workforce Competencies, 78 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (2008). For a
critique of such arguments, see Luke C. Harris, Prologue, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2003); Charles R.
Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 928 (2001).
194. The Law School articulated this framing. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16 (describing the “non-
academic” criteria as assessing an applicant’s “potential ‘to contribute to the learning of those around them’”
and the goal of a critical mass to “ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the
Law School.”).
195. See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[G]overnment is not disqualified from acting in response to [past
discrimination]”).
196. In Bakke, Justice Powell held that diversity was a compelling state interest. However, lower courts
struggled to determine the precedential effect of this component of the opinion. Grutter definitively estab-
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compelling interest in the context of higher education.197 Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke began to shape the Court’s narrow conceptualization of remediable discrimina-
tion.198 Central to this narrow lens is the notion that an institution may only engage
in race-conscious behavior designed to remedy its own acts of identifiable discrimina-
tion.199 The Court has since adopted the position that the Constitution prohibits
many race-conscious policies designed to remedy “societal discrimination.”200 To
justify this “identifiable”-“societal” divide, the Court emphasized the “problems”
that would arise from the “amorphous” and unbound character of societal discrimina-
tion.201 Societal discrimination troubles the court on multiple levels. Without an
identifiable perpetrator, the Court is unable to establish a neutral baseline to guide
remedial policies. Justice O’Connor exhibited this anxiety in Croson, as she explained
that “a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire
industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of
the injury it seeks to remedy.”202 Unable to determine the victims of “actual” discrimi-
nation,203 there is no way to guarantee that the beneficiaries of race-conscious poli-
cies have actually suffered legally cognizable harms. Beneficiaries thus could receive
an “undeserved racial preference” at the expense of “innocent” third parties. Framed
in this way, the Court views policies designed to remedy societal discrimination or
lished diversity as a compelling interest in higher education. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1979). See also Grutter, 538 U.S. at 325 (“[C]ourts have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell’s
diversity rationale . . . is nonetheless binding precedent.”).
197. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (“The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating,
or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”). Before Bakke, several
employment cases established the Court’s modern understanding of legally cognizable discrimination. The
current standard, first expressly stated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), requires a showing of
discriminatory intent. Davis expressly limited the disparate impact standard from Griggs to Title VII claims of
discrimination.
198. In addition to remedying societal discrimination, Justice Powell explicitly denied a compelling
interest in (1) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the
medical profession,” and (2) “increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 306-07. See also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1989) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at
307) (“Justice Powell contrasted the ‘focused’ goal of remedying ‘wrongs worked by specific instances of racial
discrimination’ with ‘the remedying of the effects of “societal discrimination,”’ an amorphous concept that
may be ageless in its reach to the past.”).
201. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy . . . [In contrast, t]he State certainly has a legitimate and substantial
interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 (“[S]ocietal discrimination [is] an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless
in its reach to the past.”).
202. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
203. There is nothing natural about this particular conception of discrimination. In limiting cognizable
discrimination to intent-based acts, the Court is making a normative decision based on the implications of a
broader impact-driven framework. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (“A rule that a statute
designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid . . . would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing statutes”); see also Paul Brest,
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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racial underrepresentation as nothing more than unconstitutional racial balanc-
ing.204
These concerns are inapposite to rescaling, which exemplifies the Court’s notion
of constitutional race-consciousness.205 Rescaling is immune to the “racial balanc-
ing” and “innocent third party” objections. As a fair measures intervention, rescaling
is not designed nor intended to ameliorate the remnants of past or present societal
discrimination.206 Rather, it corrects a particular, quantifiable measurement bias
present in contemporary admissions policies. Reliance on defective tools forecloses
qualified and talented Black and Latino/a students from receiving a race-blind re-
view. The concept of innocent third parties is only intelligible if the beneficiaries of a
race-conscious policy are otherwise undeserving. Because rescaling is a corrective
mechanism that enables qualified students to display their actual talent, innocent
third parties do not exist.207
Instead, in reorienting the cause of underrepresentation from deficient minorities
to deficient tests, one could view the rationale underlying rescaling as a reconception
of the “innocent third party.” The innocents are no longer students failing to obtain
admission as a consequence of race-conscious policies. The “harmed innocents” are
actually the qualified vulnerable Black and Latino/a students who are denied a mecha-
nism to show the true measure of their talent. Since stereotype threat precludes our
current practices from providing a truly race-free, individualized review of student
merit, rescaling’s effect on the status quo brings us closer to our color-blind ideal. In
this sense, rescaling addresses the kind of harm underlying the Court’s traditional
understanding of legally cognizable and remediable discrimination.
Before proceeding to the narrow tailoring analysis, it is important to briefly recall
Justice Powell’s forgotten insight. As a means of correcting race-based measurement
biases, rescaling is an example of a race-conscious policy that ensures the “fair ap-
204. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (“‘Relief ’ for such an ill-defined wrong could extend until the percentage
of public contracts . . . mirrored the percentage of minorities in the population as a whole.”).
205. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (“States and their local subdivisions have many legislative
weapons at their disposal both to punish and prevent discrimination and to remove arbitrary barriers to
minority advancement.”).
206. Rescaling is also distinguishable from Professor Cunningham’s “lingering effects” argument, which
understands present “patterns of exclusion that match historical group-based discrimination” as a recognized
compelling government interest. Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury & John D. Skrentny, Passing Strict
Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835, 854 (2002). Cunning-
ham’s articulation of lingering effects would fall somewhere in between the most amorphous conceptualiza-
tion of societal discrimination and the specific, quantifiable and locatable discrimination rescaling is meant to
remedy. This argument fails to challenge the assumption that “race-blind” criteria such as the LSAT accu-
rately measure student talent. The lingering effects rationale is instead premised on the notion that past
discrimination produces inferior opportunities for preparation, conceived as a form of discrimination that
justifies race-consciousness.
207. Some may argue that the court’s opinion in Ricci v. Destefano, 129 S. Ct 2658 (2009), suggests
otherwise. While the Court identified expectation rights in that particular factual scenario, it is unclear that
such an expectation right could extend to a rescaling policy implemented prior to a testing cycle. Others may
argue that due to the variance in stereotype threat—some Black students are affected more than others and
some White students are threatened as a result of class—rescaling will create innocent third parties if only
some threats are countered and if others are overcompensated. For a response to this critique, see infra
Part III.C.2.
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praisal of each individual’s academic promise in light of some cultural bias in grading
or testing procedures.”208 In recognizing the non-preferential nature of such a policy,
Justice Powell foreshadowed the potential for rescaling to reshape our traditional
understanding of the compelling interests of diversity and remedying discrimination.
C. Fatal in Fact? Narrow Tailoring
At this point, we have situated rescaling within two, interdependent compelling
interests. It is now necessary to demonstrate that rescaling is narrowly tailored to
achieve these ends. Narrow tailoring includes several components:209 (1) the racial
classification must not be overinclusive or underinclusive;210 (2) the classification
must remain flexible and treat people as individuals;211 (3) the classification should
include a sunset;212 and (4) there must be no race-neutral alternative.213 I conclude
by addressing each component in turn.214
1) Policy Must Not Be Overinclusive or Underinclusive
Opponents of rescaling will argue that the policy is overinclusive and underinclu-
sive. These claims will exist even if opponents concede that stereotype threat impacts
the performance of vulnerable Black applicants. The objection arises from the recog-
nition that stereotype threat does not impact all Black students equally. Even control-
ling for vulnerability, a uniform rescaling fails to account for individual differences in
stereotype threat susceptibility. Thus, a four-point rescaling will under-compensate
certain students, and over-compensate others.215
Ultimately, this is an objection to rescaling’s lack of absolute precision. While this
is a valid critique, we should not overstate the likely over/under-inclusiveness of this
policy. Informed by our best understandings of stereotype threat, rescaling is de-
signed to mitigate overcompensation.216 The presence of a 150-point floor, below
208. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1979).
209. This operationalization of narrow tailoring was adopted from Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell,
Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring after Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007).
210. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469 (invalidating a government set-aside because the policy included racial and
ethnic groups who could not possibly have been the victim of previous discrimination).
211. In the educational context, policies may not involve “strict quotas” or hard factors that make race the
determinative factor in an applicant’s review. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“Truly
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way . . . To be narrowly
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.”).
212. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“Race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.”);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 510. For a relevant
response to this element of narrow tailoring, see Kang & Banaji, supra note 14, at 1116 (“[S]teps taken to
provide fairer measures of merit can sunset when we demonstrate that mismeasurement is no longer taking
place. The narrow tailoring here is obvious.”).
213. See, e.g., Grutter 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, good faith consider-
ation of workable race-neutral alternatives.”); Croson, 488 U.S. 510 (condemning the policy in part for failure
to attempt race-neutral alternatives).
214. For an argument in favor of applying social science findings to the narrow tailoring analysis of
race-conscious programs, see Cunningham, Loury & Skrentny, supra note 206.
215. This argument assumes a large deviation in effect sizes. It is possible that stereotype threat similarly
impacts vulnerable students and produces a relatively small standard deviation.
216. For constitutional purposes, this is a much larger concern than undercompensation.
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which rescaling does not occur, minimizes overinclusiveness by limiting rescaling to
those students that stereotype threat is most likely to affect.217 Since the science tells
us that stereotype threat is most detrimental to the vanguard of the group, restricting
rescaling to students scoring one standard deviation above their group mean tracks
the boundaries of the phenomenon.218
Notwithstanding the existence of a floor, demanding absolute precision is asking
for more than the present system currently provides. Standardized test makers refute
the notion that individual scores accurately measure student talent. The LSAT is no
different. The Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which creates and adminis-
ters the LSAT, is open about the fact that individual scores are far from precise.219
Beyond concerns with predictive validity, an individual’s score does not even repre-
sent their “true talent,” but rather falls inside a range of scores within which exists the
individual’s actual proficiency.220 This range is currently represented by a 7-point
band, which encompasses the test-taker’s actual proficiency only 68% of the time.221
This band and level of proficiency makes sense given the standard deviation falls
around 8 points.222 Thus understood, the LSAT results in broad, grotesque chunk-
ing. The LSAC has never presented the LSAT as a precise measure of talent. In many
ways, the stereotype threat mean effect is a more precise measure than an individual
LSAT score. Considering the LSAT’s inherent lack of precision, invalidating a rescal-
ing policy for failure to achieve absolute precision would be a severe instance of
sacrificing the better for the perfect.
2) Policy Must Remain Flexible and Treat People as Individuals
Opponents will argue that rescaling’s allocation of hard points forecloses the
possibility of individualized review. This argument characterizes rescaling as a re-
packaged version of Michigan’s invalidated admissions policy in Gratz.223 Common-
217. Some may challenge the 150-point floor as arbitrary, and point to a lack of evidence supporting the
claim that stereotype threat begins to adversely affect test-takers who score beyond this point. This argument
again trades on fragile demands for precision. The floor derives from the mean LSAT score for Black students
plus the standard deviation, thus placing all students in this group in the top 20% of LSAT takers for their
group. There is thus an implicit assumption that the top 20% of Black LSAT takers are the vanguard and most
vulnerable to stereotype threat.
218. The presence of a floor should additionally relieve concerns that rescaling limits the ability to
maintain elite institutions.
219. See LSAC, WHAT IS A SCORE BAND, http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Publications/PDFs/
scorebands.pdf (“The LSAT, like any standardized test, is not a perfect measuring instrument . . . An error-
free score, called a true score, could only be obtained from a hypothetical test that contained no measurement
error. The standard error of measurement is used to construct score bands, which are used in score reports to
quantify the uncertainty inherent in individual test scores.”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES, supra note 20.
223. In contrast to the Law School’s holistic review, the Undergraduate College’s 20-point allocation
proved fatal. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) (“The Law School engages in a
highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
271-72 (2003) (criticizing undergraduate race-conscious admissions scheme for failing to provide meaningful
review of each individual file).
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alities between the policies exist. The twenty points allotted to underrepresented
minorities in Gratz arguably mirrors rescaling’s uniform race-based point distribu-
tion. Emphasizing this similarity and the Court’s hostility toward Michigan’s policy,
rescaling’s inflexible allocation of hard points may appear fatal.224
While superficially appealing, this analogy breaks down. First, it is fundamentally
problematic to judge rescaling’s constitutionality by reference to its location on the
Gratz-Grutter spectrum. Both Michigan policies were designed to promote the com-
pelling interest of diversity. Thus, the Court’s narrow tailoring analysis occurred
with respect to this particular goal.225 Since rescaling is not limited to diversity
interests,226 judging its constitutionality cannot occur through a simple analogy to
Gratz. In Gratz, the Court’s hostility to inflexible points was based on the notion that
the point distribution, as a means to promote diversity, contravened meritocratic
review.227 Nothing linked the policy to the promotion of color-blind admissions.228
Rescaling is fundamentally different. Based on the interdependent goals of fair
measures and an updated understanding of diversity, rescaling requires a narrow
tailoring analysis that parallels these interests. Proper analysis must be situated within
a baseline that recognizes the four-point measurement bias afflicting vulnerable Black
applicants. This measurement bias is the precise type of process defect Chief Justice
Rehnquist repudiated in Gratz.229 Reframed in this way, rescaling’s utilization of
hard parts more accurately describes the amelioration of a race-dependent distortion
of student talent and promotes the goal of individualized review.230 Gratz proves to
be of limited value in this particular context.231
224. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (“The only consideration that accompanies this distribution of points is a
factual review of an application to determine whether an individual is a member of one of these minority
groups.”).
225. While an independent prong of analysis, narrow tailoring is unintelligible without reference to a
compelling interest. This is the core of any “fit” analysis.
226. As mentioned in Part III.B, even with respect to diversity, the rationale underlying rescaling moves
beyond the limited notion of diversity Justice O’Connor articulated in Grutter.
227. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (citing Powell, J) (explaining that a ‘plus’ factor was constitutionally permis-
sible because it may “allow for ‘[t]he file of a particular black applicant [to] be examined for his potential
contribution to diversity without the factor being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an
applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities far more likely to
promote beneficial educational pluralism’”).
228. Even when reconceptualizing merit in terms of the ability to enhance diversity, the Gratz Court
understood the Michigan policy as a denial of individualized review. See id. at 273 (“Instead of considering
how the differing backgrounds, experiences, and characteristics of students A, B, and C might benefit the
University, admissions counselors reviewing LSA applications would simply award both A and B 20 points
because their applications indicate that they are African-American.”).
229. Id. (condemning a program in which “any single characteristic automatically ensure[s] a specific and
identifiable contribution to a university’s diversity).
230. Even accepting this argument, opponents may argue that the policy still fails to escape strict scrutiny
because of the determinative nature of the point allocation. See id. at 273 (“[T]he effect of automatically
awarding 20 points is that virtually every qualified underrepresented minority applicant is admitted.”). This
argument again misses the point that the act of rescaling corrects an equally determinative corruption present
in the status quo. In other words, the race of applicants is implicitly determinative—but as a function of
exclusion.
231. One final objection trades on the notion of intersectionality. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
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Additional distinctions between rescaling and the Michigan policy illustrate the
superficiality of this analogy. In Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist evoked Justice Pow-
ell’s Bakke opinion in demanding that admissions systems “consider each applicant
as an individual, assess all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn,
evaluate that individual’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher educa-
tion.”232 He summarily invalidated the university’s admissions program for failing to
live up to such a standard.233 Underlying this decision was the concern that awarding
twenty points to underrepresented minorities disallowed an “individualized consider-
ation” and that twenty points made race a decisive factor “for virtually every mini-
mally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”234 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
normative and doctrinal conceptualization of an individualized, color-blind process
mirrors the world rescaling produces.
In the abstract, the Chief Justice’s demand that a policy provide individualized
review and eliminate race as a decisive factor appears obvious and desirable. Such
reasoning prompted our immediate hostility to the four hypothetical worlds we
visited in Part II.A. Now that we have returned to a discussion on rescaling we must
not forget the lesson from that exercise. It revealed the blurriness distinguishing our
current admissions system (World Four) from overt discrimination (World One).
Thus, understanding rescaling as a manifestation of the unconstitutional behavior we
observed in World Four requires obscuring the presence of stereotype threat. When
informed by the science, World Four reemerges as a more accurate reflection of the
current admissions regime. Having reoriented ourselves, we must ask whether contem-
porary admissions policies deny students the race-free, individualized review Chief
Justice Rehnquist demanded. Since stereotype threat produces a race-dependent
measurement bias, the Chief Justice’s first concern appears to be implicated. Second,
LSAT scores are the embodiment of hard, inflexible points, and a four-point swing
will be determinative for the majority of students. The second concern appears
implicated as well. It is thus arguable that under the Chief Justice’s rationale, the
status quo is constitutionally suspect. As our opening Scantron hypothetical prompted
us to ask, if the status quo prevents vulnerable Black and Latino/a students from the
1241 (1991) (introducing the concept of intersectionality). Rescaling’s process of categorizing students on the
basis of a single race arguably obscures the multiple, intersecting identities comprising any individual student.
Failing to account for this complexity is potentially problematic given the malleable nature of stereotype
threat. See Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, supra note 51. This concern may overstated. It is likely that as a
consequence of the rule of hypodescent, see Gotanda, supra note 168, at 23-27, multiracial individuals will be
societally perceived as non-White. Thus, stereotype threat remains relevant.
232. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271. It is important to note that these comments concerned the policy’s lack of
narrow tailoring. However, applying these demands to the current admissions regime demonstrates how
rescaling corrects for the type of process-oriented discrimination Chief Justice Rehnquist condemned in
Gratz. Also, because the LSA’s policy was framed as a diversity-promoting measure, components of Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion would not inherently reflect a lack of fit with respect to rescaling.
233. The Equal Protection challenge in Gratz focused on the policy of the University of Michigan’s
College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA) to award twenty points to applicants from historically
underrepresented groups (Black, Latino/a and American Indian). The Chief Justice’s objection to the policy
arose from the belief that allocating twenty points based on race contravened the Constitution’s demand for
meritocratic, individualized admissions standards. For a critique of this framing, see Wise, supra note 116.
234. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
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individualized review our Constitution demands, how could the Constitution pro-
hibit an intervention that mitigates this defect?
3) Policy Must Have Some Sort of Sunset
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor expressed the view that temporally limitless race-
conscious policies offend the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.235 Understanding
race-conscious policies as inherently preferential, Justice O’Connor demanded that
every such policy possess a “logical end point.” She identified “sunset provisions” as a
means to satisfy this command.236 Based on this precedent, opponents will likely
identify the existence of a strict sunset as a prerequisite for any rescaling policy.
The response to sunset demands is straightforward. First, rescaling should include
a specific sunset provision. However, the sunset should not be based on arbitrary
predictions. Rather, rescaling should subside the instant that empirical studies reveal
that stereotype threat no longer produces a measurement bias on the LSAT.237 While
there is nothing wrong with temporal goals, we should base our policy decisions on
the most compelling and up-to-date scientific data.238 Kang and Banaji emphasize
this point, arguing that the “question [of when to enforce a sunset] is conceptually
easy to answer and depends on why the specific measure was adopted in the first
place . . . steps taken to provide fairer measures of merit can sunset when we demon-
strate that mismeasurement is no longer taking place.”239 Following this rationale,
once we observe the absence of measurement biases on the LSAT, we should cease
rescaling scores.
4) Policy Must Have No Race-Neutral Alternative
Are race-neutral alternatives available?240 One obvious possibility emerges. Institu-
tions could easily eliminate the site of measurement bias by foregoing reliance on the
235. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-43. This concern arises from a conceptualization of race-conscious
behavior as inherently preferential. See Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 467, 510 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (requiring that racial classifications have a termination point because it “assure[s] all citizens that the
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure
taken in the service of the goal of equality itself ”). Since rescaling promotes a more meritocratic system, the
anxiety regarding a lack of sunset may be unwarranted. The more appropriate concern may be whether
observable and quantifiable measurement defects compel intervention.
236. Justice O’Connor predicted that in twenty five years the Law School’s policy would no longer be
necessary to further the interest of student body diversity. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43.
237. For a repudiation of the notion that sunsets must be established temporally without reference to
actual societal changes, see Kang and Banaji, supra note 13, at 1116.
238. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (arguing that advances in
the understanding of social cognition theory provide compelling evidence to move away from an intent-based
antidiscrimination jurisprudence).
239. Kang & Banaji, supra note 13, at 1116.
240. Even if stereotype threat demands a race-conscious solution, opponents may challenge the decision to
focus solely on Black and Latino/a students. If stereotype threat depresses the performance of White males in
high level math programs, why not extend rescaling to such a setting? If our interest is correcting a race-
dependent measurement bias, shouldn’t we correct it everywhere it exists? The response to this tracks earlier
arguments. Rescaling’s commitment to fair measures cannot be understood without its companion concern of
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LSAT. As discussed above, complete elimination of the LSAT is doubtful.241 Consid-
ering the deference traditionally afforded educational institutions,242 the Court would
not likely demand such a complete renovation of the admissions process. Assuming
elimination of the LSAT is not required, are other race-neutral possibilities available?
Opponents may argue that focusing on socio-economic status (SES) in lieu of race
provides a suitable alternative.243 Since stereotype threat has the potential to impair
the performance of low-SES individuals, it follows that rescaling on the basis of SES
promotes fair measures without resorting to racial classifications. An institution’s
internal policy considerations may also question why we should rescale for a high
SES Black male student yet not for a low SES White female student. If correcting for
measurement bias is the actual goal of rescaling, why not remedy this problem
through a race-neutral category such as SES?
This argument has merit. There exists no inherent reason not to address measure-
ment biases associated with SES. However, focusing solely on SES fails to remedy
race-dependent measurement biases, the particular concern underlying rescaling.
Since race-dependent mis-measures exist independently of social status, a policy
targeting SES will fail to reach a significant portion of Black and Latino/a students.
Further, stereotype threat’s detrimental effects are greatest when a particular domain
implicates a negative stereotype associated with racial identities. Thus, relying on a
measure for SES or gender will undercompensate individuals suffering from a race-
dependent threat.244
Contrary to its purpose, the race-neutral alternative proves more over-inclusive
and under-inclusive than the original race-conscious plan. This result touches on the
inevitable limitations associated with utilizing race-neutral remedies to address race-
dependent problems.245 For rescaling, a policy designed to ameliorate a quantifiable
defect, it makes little sense to abandon race in lieu of a race-neutral yet less narrowly
tailored solution. Professor Ayres echoes this concern, arguing that “when the govern-
ment has a compelling interest to remedy past discrimination, the narrow tailoring
principle should not bar racial classifications that tailor the size of the [correction] to
the remedial need.”246
racially hostile environments. Since White men do not suffer from this impediment, the necessity for rescaling
is limited.
241. See West-Faulcon, supra note 29.
242. See Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 156 (“[T]his
is not your father’s strict scrutiny . . . a cursory examination of Grutter v. Bollinger . . . reveals glaring doctrinal
inconsistencies.”).
243. This argument draws upon Croson, in which Justice O’Connor suggested that Richmond could have
created a program designed to encourage the participation of small firms, since minority businesses would
have inevitably fallen into this race-neutral category.
244. Id.
245. See generally Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996) (arguing that “race-neutral
means” may be “inconsistent with narrow tailoring and may not be a less restrictive alternative than explicit
racial classifications”).
246. Id. at 1784. Additionally, since an SES-driven rescaling will likely lead to the disproportionate
increase in White, low-SES students, the race-neutral alternative would fail to address the secondary concern
of achieving a critical mass.
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CONCLUSION
Have we found a way to resuscitate Justice Powell’s forgotten insight and reinsert
it into the collective consciousness of admissions offices and equal protection jurispru-
dence? Stereotype threat appears to be the answer. Our understanding of the measure-
ment biases produced by this phenomenon provides a narrative of highly confident,
talented, and qualified Black and Latino/a students denied the neutral and color-
blind review our Constitution demands. This injury extends far beyond the moment
of admissions decision-making. Due to the disproportionate exclusion of qualified
Black and Latino/a students, the few who enter must face unique, race-dependent
challenges associated with their token status. The underperformance that often fol-
lows functions as an affirmation of the negative stereotypes that fueled stereotype
threat in the first place. This vicious cycle is not inevitable. Through a rescaling
policy that promotes fair measures through the correction of measurement biases, we
can avoid these harms. And properly situated within Justice Powell’s rationale, rescal-
ing is immune from constitutional challenge, as it “is no preference at all.”
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